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No. 80-419
Cert to CA 9
(Sneed, Kennedy concurring,
Larson, D.J., dissenting)

ARIZONA

v.
MARICOPA COUNTY MEDICAL
SOCIETY' et al.
1.

SUMMARY:

Fcc;]eral/Civil

Timely

Is the fixing of max imu.m amounts which

physician members of a medical foundation agree to accept as full
payment for services rendered to subscribing patien ts a per se
..

violation
of the Sherman Act?
. '

'

,·

- 2 -

2.
,

FACTS:

Resps are foundations for medical care (FMCs).

FMCs approve and administer insurance plans underwritten by
private insurers.

FMCs serve as agents for the underwriters,

drawing funds directly from insurers' bank accounts to pay
doctors' bills.

Other activities of the FMCs include the

setting of minimum standards and performing peer review.

They

are an alternative to closed panel pre-paid health insurance
plans, commonly known as health maintenance organiz a tions or
HMOs.

FMCs establish maximum amounts which they will reimburse

member physicians for ~erforming specific services; the
physicians agree to accept this amount, or any lesser amount they
may charge, as payment in full from covered patients.

Physician

members are periodically polled concerning what the maximum level
of reimbursement should be.

The state of Arizona brought the

instant suit, charging that the fixing of the maximum prices
which will be reimbursed to participting physicians through FM.Cs
was a form' of price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act.

The

state moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that
resps' price fixing activities were a per se violation of §1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1.
3.

DECISION BELOW:

The DC (Copple) denied the motion,

citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977) as indicating a trend away from the per se rule and citing
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975 ) and National
Societv of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(197&)

as indicating that the per se. rule should be applied to

the professions only after careful consideration.

The CA

-

3 -

affirm~d, ~ach judge writing separately.

Judge Sneed stressed

____________c:-----

that the record below revealed nothing about the actual
competitive effects of the challenged arrangement, and noted
11

. --------~------=---- . .

[i1n truth, we know very little about the impact of this and

many other arrangements within the health care industry.

This

alone should make us reluctant to invoke a per se rule with
respect to the challenged arrangement."

Judge Sneed also noted

that it was uncertain exactly what competitive model should
prevail in the health care industry.
.

had only recently come within the ambit of the Sherman Act, and

~

~-

He stated that professions

'

that the supply and demand functions in the health care industry
hardly approximated those that would prevail in a purely private
competitive order.
"---'

Judge Sneed also quoted Broadca s t Music, 441

U.S. 1, 9 (1979) for the proposition that whether to classify
something as "per se price fixing" "will often, but not always,
be a simple matter".

He argued that the question was hardly

simple in this case, since the record was devoid of any
indications of competitive effects, the petitioner state itself
reimbursed physicians at rates higher than those established by
the FMCs, nothing indicated that physician's profits had been
increased by the challenged conduct, it was unlikely that
insurance carriers would supinely stand by and perm i t physicians
to exercise monopoly power, and there was no indica t ion on the
record of the interaction of other economic actors in the health
care-•field.

Judge Sneed also "drew comfort II from the statements

in National Society of Professional Engineers and Goldfarb, that
restraints regulating professional conduct may pas s muster under

- 4 -

the rule. of reason while they would not in the purely commercial
context.

Juage Kennedy concurred, agreeing with Judge Sneed that

the court knew too little about the effects on competition
produced by the challenged practices to brand them per se
violations.

He stressed that this was not to say, however, that

a per se rule may not be proper after the facts have been
developed, or that the practices necessarily passed muster under
rule of reason analysis.

Judge Larson dissented.

He argued that

it was clear that the challenged activities constituted maximum
.. price fixing by competitors, and that this was per se illegal
regardless of any special industry factors.

Albrecht v. Herald

Co • , 39 0 U• S . 1. 4 5 , 15 1-5 3 ( 19 6 8 ) ; Ki e fer -stew a rt Co . v . Se a g ram
Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).

&

He argued that there was nothing

new about maximum price fixing schemes which would counsel
against application of the per se rule.

He noted that the price

fixing was wholly commercial in nature and bore no relation to
any public service aspect of the profession which might suggest
departure from the usual rule.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr argues that in ruling that the

reasonableness of the price fixed by the physicians through the
FMCs is a defense to price fixing, the CA put itself in conflict
with the decisions of this Court and other circuits.

In Catalano

Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 100 S. Ct at 1927, this court
recently emphasized that "It has long been settled .:hat an
agre·e meht to fix prices is unlawful p_e r se.
the prices fixed are themselves reasonable."

It is no excuse that
Petr argues, citing

the cases relied upon by Judge Larson, that this Court has long

- 5 held that horizontal maximum price fixing is per se unlawful.
Finally, petrs contend that the CA created a special standard of
liabil~ty for a professional group, contrary to National Society
of Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 689 (rejecting argument
that "because of the special characteristics of a particular
industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and
commerce than competition").
Resps reply that there is no maximum price fixing involved.
Physician foundation members are free to charge whatever prices
they desire.

The maximums in question are simply the maximum

which the physician will be reimbursed by the insurance carrier
for services rendered to a patient participating in an insurance
plan endorsed by the FMC.
reimbursed less.

Physicians charging less will be

Physicians who are not members of the FMC and

treat an FMC patient are free to look to the patient for any
excess over the maximum amount which they may charge.

Physicians

treating non-FMC patients may charge and collect amounts over the
reimbursement maximum for FMC patients.

Resps stress that the

record evidence does not establish that the FMCs exercise any
control whatsoever over the prices physicians charge.

Resps

maintain that the fact that 85-95% of the physicians in the
county serviced by the resp FMCs billed at or above the maximum
reimbursement levels should come as no surprise, since medical
fees have been rising and maximum reimbursement levels have not
changed since 1977.
decision.

Resps contend that petr miscontrues the CA

The CA did not hold that reasonableness was a defense

to price fixing, it simply required, as the Court did in

- 6 -

Continental T.V., ~33 U.S. at 58-59, that departures from the

(

rule of reason must be based upo'n demonstrable economic effect.
The majority determined that the challenged conduct, on the
present record, could not be characterized as price fixing, not
that horizontal maximum price fixing is not a per se violation.
Petrs reply that the distinction resps seek to draw between
fixing levels of reimbursement and actual price fixing is a
distinction without a difference. Petrs repeat their contention
that the CA did make reasonableness a defense to price fixing,
citing language in the opinion that "the relevant inquiry becomes
whether fees paid to doctors under that system would be Jess than
those payable under the FMC maximum fee agreement."
Three amici have filed briefs in support of petr:

the

American Association of Retired Persons and the National Retired
Teachers Association, the Gray Panthers, and the attorney
generals of 43 states.
5.

DISCUSSION:

This Court has on several occasions

cautioned that per se rules should not be applied in situations
in which the Court was not fully familiar with the industry and
the economic effects o( the various practices.

See, e.g.,

Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9 ("it is only after considerable
experience with certain business relationships that courts
classify them as per se violations")

(quoting United States v.

Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972)).

The bulk of

Judge Sneed's opinion was devoted to exploring thi s lack of
knowledge, not to accepting reasonableness of prices as a defense
to price fixing.

Judge Kennedy's concurrence was clearly based

-

..

7 -

on the court's lack of knowledge and the fact that special
considerations may come into play when dealing with a profession.
The CA's refusal to brand the FMC maximum reimbursement schedules
as per se violations of the Sherman Act seems sensible in view of
the status of the record.
I recommen~ denial.
There is a response.

10/26/80
,JBP

Roberts

Op in petn.

March 6, 1981
Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 . . .

No. 80-419

ARIZONA
vs.

MARICOPA MED. SOC.

Time for filing extended by Justice Rehnquist until July 2, 1980.

/,/'/

\,0

f

i~~~
r

~- 1/

.

~

CERT.

HOLD
FOR

D

G

JURISDICTION AL
STATEMENT

VN

POST

DIS

AFF

MERITS
REV

AFF·

MOTION
G

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

D

V .v.. ............ .

Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . .....

Brennan, J..................... i,/' ...

.................................................. .

V .... ................. ........ ........................... .

Stewart, J .....................

White, J................ . . . . . . . . . . ........................... ~... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .

v~

Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .

v':.. yi'

Blackmun, J ................. .

..................................................... .

Powell, J ........................................................................ · · · · · · · · ·
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stevens, J .............. ~ ...... /

Y. ............. ~ ............ ........................... .

................. ~ ..................................... .

•

jsw

BENCH MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Justice Powell
November 3, 1981
From: John Wiley
No. 80-419: Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, et al.

Question Presented
Whether

an

association of

doctors

commits

a

per

se

violation of the Sherman Act when it collectively sets maximum
medical service reimbursement rates to be paid by third party
insurance plans the association has approved.

I.

Background

The pr icing arrangement in this suit is complicated.
I will review the facts in some detail because the issue of the
appropriateness of a per se pricing rule depends crucially on
the,characterization of the record.
The

State

of

Arizona

brought

this

antitrust

action

~~ ~

~ ~
against

four

entities: {Dt.he

(Maricopa Society);

t~

(Maricopa Foundation);
Society) ; 1 and th~

dation).

Maricopa

Mar ico~
th~

2.

~ b"-f ~
~

k

County Medical Society

undation

for

Medical care

ima County Medical Society

(Pima

ima Found: 7on - ;or Medical Care (Pima Foun-

The Societies apparently are doctors' ~

tions for the named counties.

a-

They formed the Foundations (in

1969 in Maricopa County, J.A. 210, and in 1971 in Pima County,
It

J.A. 171) in order to promote a particular type of medical fee
arrangement:

"fee-for-service

medicine."

J.A.

171

& 210.

This arrangement exchanges dollars for particular medical services

and

contrasts

with work performed

for

a

salary basis.

See Petr brief at 5 n.4.
Foundation membership

is open to all doctors

area; about 70% of Maricopa doctors have joined.

in the

The Founda-

tions were governed by the administrative staff of the Societies. 2

The Foundations

risk.

Rather

themselves

do

not

insure

against

they approve of and perform services for

the

large

separate insurers, including Blue Shield and private for-profit
insurers.

The Foundations' services basically are those of a

1 The Pima Society settled out of this suit according to a consent judgment that, inter alia, eliminated the institutional
links between it and the Pima Foundation.
2 originally members elected to governing positions in the
Societies selected those to serve on the Foundations' governing
boards.
J.A. 189.
Since the CA9's decision, the Foundations
have amended their bylaws so as to select their Board of Trustees
by 'their membership's direct election.
See Resp brief at 10
n.30, A-6 - A-7, & A-9 - A-11.
--

3.

---------

claims agents.
medical

They review

service

for

(to some extent)
a

which

member

the need for the

doctor

has

rendered

and

~

charged.

(if the procedure is approved as necessary

They pay
A.-

-----------------------------------

and is billed at a rate not in excess of the Foundations' maximum schedule) the physician's bill from the insurers' account.
To obtain Foundation approval, the insurers must agree ~
to pay member physicians for services they render to insureds
at

the physicians'

usual and customary fees.

But these fees

~

~
~

are not to exceed a maximum price schedule that the Foundations 1--'t-,L
set.

The participating doctors in turn agree to serve consum-

ers of the Foundations' approved insurance plans and to limit
their

fees

to

usual

and

customary

Foundations' maximum schedules .
Insurance

consumers

levels

not

exceeding

the~

.

in the Foundation-approved plans

are guaranteed full coverage of their medical bills if they are
treated by member doctors.

These consumers are free to visit

nonmember doctors, however, and they are assured that the insurer will pay for
to

the

these usual and customary medical bills up

Foundations'

participating

maximum

doctors

fee.

But

from charging

nothing

more

than

prevents
this

fee.

nonIf

they do so, the consumer personally is responsible for the excess.

Consumers in the Foundation-approved plans thus have an

incentive

to

visit only participating

doctors

to

ensure

the

approved insurer picks up the entire bill.
Arizona's
price schedules.

suit

focuses

on

the

Foundations'

maximum

These schedules were formulated on a tenta-

~
~

~h

4.
C

tive basis by polling the Foundations' member physicians; the
members then voted on whether to adopt the proposed schedule. 3
The

level of

especially

these

those

fees

in

relation

charged

by

the

Foundation work and

to other

doctor

70% member doctors

fees--

for

non-

those charged by 30% non-member Maricopa

doctors for their general practice--is the subject of much dispute.4

No formal rules prevent doctors from charging less than

the maximum schedules;

indeed, the Foundations vigorously as-

sert that their member doctors have agreed that they must remain free to set their own charges.
n.28.
vent

See Resp brief at 9-10 &

Similarly, the Foundations do not have rules that pretheir

member

doctors

from

participating

with

competing

insurance plans.
The

mark ~

plans is disputed.

s~ are

of

Foundation-approved

insurance

Petr asserts that the Maricopa Foundation

plans account for "approximately" 63% of the market, as opposed

3 1 J.A. 198 ,1,1 34 & 36; 202 ,1,1 54 & 55.
After Arizona filed -='
this suit, the Foundations changed their practice of formulating
and approving the maximum fees according to member votes.
Now
the Foundations' maximum fee schedules are set solely by their
Board of Trustees. Resp brief at 10 & n.29.
4 The CA9 observed that 85-95% of Maricopa doctors bill at or
above the Maricopa Foundation's maximum level.
Petn App. at
This is not a very helpful statistic as it does not reveal whether the Foundation's maximum fees are at or below average billing
levels.
The CA9 further observed that the record does not contain data permitting a comparison of the Foundations' maximum
fees with average state fees. Id. at n.3. Arizona claims, however, that the Foundations' fee schedules exceed statewide levels.
Petr brief at 7 & n.7. The respondents contest this. Resp brief
at 18-19.

r

5.

to 16% for health maintenance organizations
the

Kaiser

plan),

and

Petr brief at 5 n.4.

21%

for

other

("HMO's," such as

indemnification

plans.

Resp vigorously contests the accuracy of

this data, claiming it is "disingenuous" to attempt to calculate market shares from "this small, unrepresentative sample •
II

Resp brief at 11 n.31.

Apparently the record contains

no information regarding the changes in market share over time.
On this record, the DC refused to grant Arizona's request

for

The CA9

a

preliminary

accepted

injunction and

for

summary judgment.

the certified question of whether

arrangement is per se illegal.

this

fee

The CA9 rejected Arizona's con-

tention and affirmed (over one dissent).

II.

Discussion

/

At this stage in the litigation, this case is governed
by Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8-9, 19-20 (1979).
The question is whether this suspicion-arousing arrangement can
claim sufficient justification to avoid the fatal "price fixing" characterization.

This requires an understanding of the

purpose and function of this pricing arrangement. 5

.
. 1" max..unum
.
.
wo cases f rom t h 1s
Court h ave f oun d V"
vert1ca
price
fixing to be illegal.
See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968) ~ Kiefer-Stewart C~v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340
U.S. 211 (l95l). This case has a horizontal as p e_£.t that could be
used to distinguish these E"wo case s.
More candidly, however,
v these decisions are suspect and should not control the sound and
traditional approach of Broadcast Music. For elaboration, I refer you to pages 2-5 of the Easterbrook artl.£J. e (attached) you
asked me to examine. I think h i s comments are essentially sound.
Footnote continued on next page.
5T

~ ~/:i:n-u

'-A - (

I

._ ,

J 6' -

__.

~

D"~~ ,-~

6•

~~(~
I
,,

When price fixing sets a minimum price, its motivation
is clear:

to increase producers' revenues in anticompetitive

fashion.

But the motivation for maximum pr ice fixing is less

apparent;

absent further

explanation,

tage those who under take it.

it appears to disadvan-

A number of motivations can be

offered as reasons why an industry would seek to limit prices
collectively. 6

The one asserted by the resps in this case is

I differ semantically by thinking attention should not be devoted
to wrestling over whether per se treatment differs for maximum
and minimum pr icing arrangements.
Rather I would simply focus
attention
on
the
asserted
justification
for
the
pricing
arrangement--whatever its character.
This alligns with recent
precedent, e.g., Broadcast Music; Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales,
Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 646 n.8 (1980), and ensures that DCs treat
price
arrangements
among
competitors
with
due
wariness.
Easterbrook would not, I think, have serious disagreements with
this focus on asserted justification and this condemnation absent
adequate justification.
See Easterbrook at 7 ("If sellers have
no plausible--that is, profitable--reason for reducing their
prices, we may infer that any given maximum price agreement is
actually a traditional cartel in disguise.").
~~
6 Easterbrook sets forth three types of efficiencies that an ~
in~
d st
might be able to acfiTev e c firou gn'"'1ITT{x 1mum price setting.
Th fir
is that a subset on the industry might want to identify ,
itse
to consumers as low-priced.
The motive for this - t ype of ~
agreeme n t , a Rl. n to aavert i sing, ' would be to lower consumer search
costs, thus increa sing tn e subset's sales to these informed consumers. Easterbrook at 7-9.
The ~
'> efficiency would economize on transactions
costs.
Thes ~
are of four types.
(1)
Maximum fee schedules permit both doctors and patients to avoid the costl
rocess
of learning t e prev 1 1ng mar
or complex proce ures.
(2)
They permit fees to be established in advance of emergency
treatment.
(3)
They reduce insurers' costs of supervising doctor/patient transactions to ensure that economical decisions are
being made.
(4)
They reducing the expense of bargaining over
fees. Easterbr~
at 10-13.
The
hir
efficiency is that maximum pr ice schedules
p~rmi t doctor
market a "new product:"
to of fer their serices in a manner that insures consumers against the risk of both
eed and expense for medical care.
Easterbrook at 13-15. This
Footnote continued on next page.

r~

7.

the

importance of maximum pr ice schedules to the abilil ty of

----

doctors to offer a pro-competitive new "unique product."

.__

-

Resps

_______..

brief at 37.

ed

Although resps do not spell out all the analysis need'
.
'f y their assertion, I am persuaded--weakly--that
JUSt

to

their claim is credible.

The ~

ique product:J is 100% prepaid

medical service provided by consumer-selected providers.

This

~

combination of medical

service choice and 100% insurance ap-

~

pears to be something that neither separate insurers nor individual

physicians

price schedules.

can

furnish

economically

without

maximum

Separate medical insurers working without an

advance maximum fee understanding with doctors must either bargain

with

treatment

each

doctor

over

billing

prior

to

each

insured' s

(a costly and--in emergency situations--often impos-

sible task), must reserve the option of refusing to pay part of
the doctor's bill

(thus preventing the insurer from guarantee-

ing the insured 100% coverage), or must pay whatever the treating

physician

decides

to

charge

after

the

services

are

performed--a situation ripe with possibilities for "blackmail"
by

doctors.

Such

"blackmail" could

increase

insurers'

costs

and drive insurance rates beyond competitive levels.
Alternatively,

individual

doctors

cannot

offer

100%

prepaid service unless they combine into groups large enough to

last economy is particularly important in this case.
7~8 of this memo.

See pages

8.

take advantage of the risk smoothing that allows
forecast
terms.

individually

uncertain

risks

in

insurers to

accurate

aggregate

Large "firms" of doctors that pay each on a salary ba-

sis could assume this function.
ing of the definition of an HMO.

Indeed, this is my understandSee Havighurst, Health Main-

tenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services, 35 L.
&

Contemp. Problems 716, 718-20 (1970).

For doctors who prefer

the advantages of a sole practioner's life 7 and for consumers
who prefer wider freedom to select their treating doctor, however, some type of arrangement with a separate insurer must be
made

if

economical

100% prepaid

financing

is

to be offered.

The need for doctors to offer such an arrangement could become
pressing if that is what consumers prefer.
dence that it is.

There is some evi-

See resp brief at 11 n.31. 8

7 The ability of doctors to take the initiative to preserve a
sole practitioner, or "fee-for-service," working arrangement
seems to me to be the real issue in this suit. Without empicial
support, I assume some doctors are fond of this billing arrangement because they believe it allows them to make more money.
(There are, of course, all the additional intangibles of working
for oneself in a small business.
I conjecture that the choice
might be similar to deciding whether to work as a lawyer in a
corporation at a set salary versus working in a partnership where
earnings are on more of a "fee-for-service" basis.)
The consumers' greater freedom in selecting individual doctors in the
Foundations' prepaid system must convince consumers who are willing to pay for these plans that there is a discernable quality
difference in the treatment available.
8 This combination of physicians and insurers amounts to an
"integration" if it permits greater efficiency.
As its result,
consumers presumably can obtain 100% prepayment of medical services of quality not available in HMO alternatives.
(If consumeis cannot, the Foundations' plans soon will be out of business.)
This "integration" responds to §D of the SG's brief (horizontal
Footnote continued on next page.

~

9.

The Foundations assert that they are designed to maintain the fee-for-service arrangement.

See page 2 supra.

analysis

is

fact.

just

Indeed,

reviewed

suggests

this

what

they

even Professor Havighur st--one of

to

The
do

in

the Founda-

tions' most persistent ,---...__critics--concedes that "foundations are
dedicated to lowering costs and improving quality and have been
shown
sional

to have

some

Restraints

303, 377.

beneficial effects."

Havighurst,

on Health Care Financing,

1978 Duke L.

J.

This legitimating explanation does distinguish this

maximum price fixing/insurance arrangement from a
mill per se illegal minimum pricing collusion.
is not strong, however,
why pr ice

Profes-

setting

run-of-the-

The explanation

because the Foundations do not defend

by 70% of the doctors

type of product now offered.

is necessary to the

It would seem this price schedul-

ing activity could be performed by insurers who are independent
of the organized medical community.
15-24.

See Ohio amicus brief at

One thus should be sympathetic to petr 's claims that

maximum pricing per se illegal without absent showing that it is
necessary to "cooperative productive agreement") and §IIA of
Petr's Reply (no issue for trial because there is no economic
integration).
Whether the benefits of the integration justify
its anticompetitive potential, of course, is the rule of reason
issue that remains for trial after the instant per se question
has been settled.
See, e.g., Petn App. (Kennedy, J. , concurring
in decision below) ("This is not to suggest, however, that I have
found these reimbursement schedules to be per se proper, that an
examination of these practices under the rule of reason at trial
will not reveal the proscribed adverse effect on competition, or
that this court is foreclosed at some later date, when it has
more evidence, from concluding that such schedues do constitute
p~r se violations.").

?

10.

this

arrangement will

But petr

injure competitive activity.

fails to present a convincing argument on this point.

-

The weakest aspect of the p~r's case is its schizophrenic

failure

to decide whether

the maximum pr ice schedule

harms consumers by raising or by lowering otherwise prevailing
prices. 9
sake

On one hand,

of

argument,

petrs are willing to "assume, for

that

respondents'

maximum rather

than minimum fees

n.35

added).

(emphasis

traditional
variety.lo

injury

of

schedules

fee
II

set

Petr brief at 28

Genuine maximum pr ices
cartel-like

the

minimum

do

not

pr ice

cause
fixing

Easterbrook surveys the possible injuries that such

9 This divided attitude can be seen in the dissent from the
opinion below.
Compare Petn App at 28 ( "defendants have quite
openly stated that their purpose is to protect fee-for-service
medicine against competing forms of health care delivery") (note
that such "protection" could only be achieved by holding down
pr ices to exclude these competing forms--unless other predatory
tactics, which are not alleged, have been employed) with id. at
30 ("I am confident that the fee schedule does have the effect of
raising prices, and that in 'its absence consumers would ultimately obtain less expensive medical care.") (emphasis added).
lOProfessor Sullivan identifies three possible motivations for
maximum prices:
to deter entry into the industry; to discourage
innovation-competition; and to ration short-run shortages.
L.
Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Anti trust 211-12 (1977).
Petr
does not argue that any of these hazards are dangers of the arrangement in question.
Much of the commentary on which petr's brief relies does
explain maximum fee schedules as devices to limit entry.
E.g.,
Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control By Third Party Payors:
Fee
Schedules and the Sherman Act, 1978 Duke L.J. 645, 681 ("Professor Havighurst has forcefully argued that the very purpose of
[foundations] is to set an entry-discouraging price that will
preclude other forms of third party competition and thus that a
p~r se rule would be appropriate to condemn them.
Indeed, an
antitrust rule against horizontally fixing maximum, as opposed to
minimum, prices makes sense only because of the probability that
Footnote continued on next page.

11.

In my view,

agreements could create.

he convincingly rebuts

such fears--at least for this record. 11
On the other hand, petr suggests that "there is much
to argue that what is involved here is a minimum or uniform fee
schedule."

Petr

brief at 28 n.35

(emphasis added).

But the

--

arrangement by its terms does not fix minimum prices.

------

Petr's

argument thus must be that circulation of a maximum schedule
causes "conscious parallelism" or implicit collusion.

Whether

this can be judged on this record is a closer question.

~

Such

an inquiry generally should examine industrial structure, history,

and

behavior

to

determine

whether

facilates the operation of a cartei. 12

the

arrangement

But such information is

entry-limiting pr icing is involved.") (footnotes omitted) .
This
limit price theory holds that the fee schedules are holding down
the prices that otherwise would prevail.
11

-

see Easterbrook at 19-22.

12 see L. Sullivan at 270-73 (analyzing United States v. Container<:orp., 393 U.S. U.S. 333 (1969), and the analysis it suggests ,
for price information programs); Easterbrook at 15-18 (outlining ~
similar inquiry). The majority below acknowleged that resps will
have to survive such an inquiry before this litigation is complete. See Petn App at 7-8 (citing a predecessor of the Container case:--American Column & Lumber Co. v. U.S., 268 U.S. 563
(1925)).
In one of his few examinations of the arrangement in
question, the SG observes that doctors will not have an incentive
to charge less than the maximum fees specified in the schedule.
This is true, and it is definitely a troubling feature of this
arrangement. But it is in the insurers' interest to avoid rather
than to facilitate a doctors' cartel.
Insurers' premiums will
suffer if their "stable" of doctors uses the insurance program to
raise prices above those of the rest of the industry.
One thus
wquld expect insurers to abandon the Foundations' pr ice setting
if it leads to cartelized price increases. Because there are no
impediments that I am aware of to such action by insurers, it is
Footnote continued on next page.

12.

not in this record.
I

conclude that,

in effect,

~~

has raised a prima

facie case of pricing fixing by showing a horizontal agreement
for setting prices.

~ s rebut this application of the per se

rule by showing a weak but credible redeeming
the otherwise-impossible availabili t
care of consumer-chosen quality.

of 100%

justification-repaid medical

Petr now fails

to overcome

1~

this rebuttal by pointing to any substantiated competitive hazard.

If fact, petr presents no consistent theory at all of how

the arrangement in question injures consumers.

This is quite
---..,

different than the typical per se situation in which the summary rule is justified by an obvious threat of competitive injury.
The

basis

for

this

holding

should

be

the

Broadcast

Music rationale--not that there is no per se rule againt maxi-

difficult to condemn the arrangement without more information on
the structure of the insurance and medical industries.
Cf.
Havighurst, supra, 35 L. & Contemporary Problems, at 774 ("A per : '
se rule should probably not be adopted without a full judicial
inquiry into the nature and functioning of foundations plans, and
the outcome of such an inquiry is not easy to predict.") (footnote omitted).
Whether such structural hazards exist as to render doctors' maximum price schedules unacceptable is an appropriate subject of inquiry on remand. The Court should say so in its opinion.
A particularly troublesome point--not illuminated on the
present record--is whether the Foundation insurers primarily are
doctor-dominated Blue Shield/Blue Cross organizations.
If so,
this cause for concern--when joined with the fact that the Foundations themselves need not set fees for this arrangement to
work--quite possibility would be enough to condemn this arrangement
under an expanded analysis on remand.
,

13.

mum price

fixing.

In my view,

this

case as it is a maximum price case.

is as much an insurance
Without the insurance ra-

tionale, the price arrangement would have no justification and
should be per se illegal.
The arrangement still has hazards that are grave--as
one

would

expect

about their price.

when

competitors

gather

See note 12 supra.

to

decide

anything

The Court should make

clear in its opinion that these hazards are serious.

But these

should be examined on a fuller record in accord with the analysis suggested by the Container case.

See note 12 supra.

The

CA9 decision should be affirmed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

III.
The

Conclusion

suggestions from Albrect and Kiefer-Stewart that

maximum price fixing always be found per se illegal are inadequately reasoned to control this case.
Music,

resps present a

tice.

In

-----schedule s

particular,

In line with Broadcast

justification for
resps

point

out

their pr icing prac-

that

the

-----

maximum

fee

are necessary to provision of an otherwise uneconomi-

cal product:

100% prepaid medical service provided by the doc-

tor of the consumer's choice.

This necessitates further factu-

al examination of the practice's asserted benefits and harms.
Since petr presents no coherent credible theory about how this
ar.:rangement

is

likely

to

cause

consumer

injury,

the maximum

schedule should not be invalidated on a per se basis at this

14 .

••

stage of the litigation.

The practice of doctors'

voting to

set their own reimbursement levels is worrisome, however, particularly when the practice involves such a large segment (70%)
of

the medical community and does

"new product" tht is offered.

not

seem essential to the

The arrangement may well prove

vulnerable under a more complete examination.

---

be affirmed and
and analysis.

remanded

for

this fuller

The case should

factual development

80-419
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Justice Powell
November 5, 1981
From: John Wiley
No. 80-419: Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, et al.

Upon
analysis),

further

reflection·

(and

writing

out

my

added

I now adhere to my original recommendation that you

vote to remand with careful instructions as to further proceedings.
The

test

that should govern this case

is that pr ice

agreements among competitors are illegal per se unless (1) they
achieve an economic efficiency
are

necessary

applied most
schedules

to

that

recently

here

at

(an "integration") and

integration.

This traditional law was

in Broadcast Music.

issue

satisfy

the

(2) they

first

The maximum pr ice
er i ter ion

because

they make economical 100% prepaid medical insurance a feasible
product.

My first bench memo elaborates the reasoning for this

··,
~·;,

2.

at pages 7-8.
The
extensive
pr ice

more

troublesome

participation

schedules

arrangement.

is

The

in

the

necessary
doctors

issue

is

whether

formulation

to

claim

the
that

of

the

doctors'

these

economy achieved
administratively

maximum
by
it

the
is

easier for them, rather than the insurance companies, to formulate these schedules.

There is some administrative cost sav-

ings, as I will show.

The problem in this case is to balance

the likely size of this efficiency against the collusive threat
posed by the doctors' pricing activity.
1.
tion

is

not

The efficiency savings achieved by doctor consultagreat.

The

Foundations'

seem to occur in three basic steps:
ferent types of medical procedures,

pr ice
(1)

scheduling would

identifying the dif-

(2) tentatively determining

a market price, and (3) signing up individual doctors who agree
to be bound by the proposed price.

The first step is a type of

"start-up cost" that has already been accomplished for Maricopa
county; insurance companies can adopt the organization and relative values of the existing fee schedules as a starting point.
Organized doctor participation is not necessary.
The second step is a consultative process.

The Foun-

dation management surveys various doctors and specialty groups
to form tentative price proposals.

See J.A. 198-203 a t , , 34,

36, 37, 38, 41, 44, 54, 57, & 58.

It seems to me that the in-

dividual insurers would follow exactly the same pattern of consultation.

The Foundations would achieve some administrative

3.

cost savings by avoiding the need for each insurer to perform
this activity individually.
The third step, if performed solely by insurers, also

------"-""""

~

could follow the Foundations' current practice.

--,

Doctors could

join an insurer's plan and vote on price proposals in the same
manner

that

they now

price proposals.
would

lead

schedule--as
brief

fact

to

join the Foundations and

vote on their

I imagine that a vote to reject the schedules
negotiation,

seems

to

statement

be
at

compromise,

and

a

new

the practice at present.
9-12.

Again,

the

proposed
See petr

Foundation

could

achieve some administrative cost savings by avoiding the duplication that would occur with seven different fee negotiations
and votes.
I conclude the only real efficiency savings that the
Foundations offer is the avoidance of duplication costs in the
polling and voting
quite real;

by doctors. 1

These saving,

however,

seem

the petr certainly has not demonstrated that they

are de minimis.

2.

The

threat

of

collusion

among

doctors

does

not

1 rt may be possible to achieve these cost savings through the
use of an independent agency that performs this costing function
for the Maricopa medical community. The petr, however, does not
propose this and the practicality of such an arrangement is open
to some question.
I do not think this record is adequate to say
presently that this is a viable alternative to the existing arrangement •

...

;

-

.

4.

seem overwhelming.

The medical industry is not concentrated.

There are many independent producers, especially when compared
with

industries

tion.

like automobile manufacture or

steel produc-

Implicit price agreement thus is less likely.

And the

insurers have an interest in lowering the cost of their payments

to doctors

competitive.

so as

to

keep their own insurance premiums

The insurance companies therefore have an inter-

est contrary to that of any doctors' cartel, which would seek
to

increase medical pr ices.

insurance

companies

will

This makes

permit

the

it less

insurance

likely that

maximum pr ice

schedules to become a means of doctor cartel pricing.
On the other hand, common sense shows some threat of
collusion lurks every time competitors meet to discuss common
concerns.

This threat is heighted when the discussion explic-

itly centers on price.

Moreover, the traditional professional

norms of doctors regard vigorous price competition as unprofessional.

The

profession

is

accustomed

to

collective

control

over price.
I

conclude

that

the

threat

of

collusion,

not

while

~

overwhelming, is present in some degree.

Given the real but relatively small risk of collusion
present
cient

in this industry,

to

efficiency

establish
savings

this
the

------

I conclude this record
risk outweighs

Foundations'

~

the

is

real but

arrangement

insuff iunknown

permits.

therefore stick to my original recommendation to remand.

I
This

5.

disposition in essence is an application of the burden of proof
in these cases.

Petr as plaintiff and as movant for summary

judgment has the burden of persuasion.

Here there

is enough

doubt about the justification for and threat from the arrangement under attack to hold that petr has not discharged its burden.

The remand should be accompanied by careful instructions.

These should focus the DC's inquiry and avoid an ill-

defined

and

endless voyage

into

the

rule of

reason.

Pre se

prohibition may yet be appropriate,

if petr can establish

alternative

structures

feasible

institutional

most of the economies of
threat

of

collusion or

could

(1)

achieve

the present arangement with a lower
(2)

the

nature

of

this

industry,

as

shown by a Container type of structural and historical analysis,

renders

this

field

so susceptible to cartelization that

this threat outweighs this arrangement's administrative economies.

(

(

Con f •
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Justice Rehnquist
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Justice O Connor
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.§u.prtmt <q"ourt of tlrt 'J!{nittb ,§taus

'lUas~ington. [S. <q". 2llgi)l..;J
,,

CHAMBERS OF

1

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

November 23, 1981

Re:

No. 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society, et al.

Dear Chie·f:
I agree with your suggested order •
Sincerely,
. J

f
T.M.
~
,·.,:)i Ao

. .

.(

,"<.

•

-'.rJ

i

The Chief Justice
cc:

ii
.

1'

.. I

., ,

I

The Conference

....
.§u:punu QJ:o-ttrl cf f:qt 'J!lnittb .§brlt~
'Jlfag4htgfctt, ~. QI. 20p.l!,
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 23, 1981

Re:

80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County

Dear Chief:
If there is a Court for the disposition you
propose, I will be writing in dissent.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.§npumt <!fttttrl cf tJ:rt 'J!initt~ ~btltAl'

~ag4ingfon. !l. <!f. 20.;r.Jt~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVEN!;i

November 23, 1981

Re:

80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County

Dear Chief:
If there is a Court for the disposition you
propose, I will be writing in dissent.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

November 24, 1981

80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County

Dear ChiPf:
Possibly my notes are jn error, but they s how that
the only firm voteq for a DIG in this case were yours and
~hurgood's. As oresently Advised, I continue to thin k that
a DIG is inappropriate.
My notes indicate that ,'Tohn and Bi 11 ~renn n would
reverse, and hold that there was a cons~iracy by competing
doctors to fix prices.

I unoerstooa that Byron would remand without
deciding whether there has been a per se violation or
whether the rule of reason is applicable. As Byron put it,
we need a more adequate record before deciding this case on
:I.ts merits. Both Bill Rehnquist and I expressed vi.ews
generally similar to those of Byron.

As we have only a seven member Court, there would
be no Court opinion, unless you revert to your alternative
vote which - as recorded in my notes - was to remand. You
stated that summary judgment had been granted prematurely,
and that the record before us is inadequate, a view that
appears to be similar to that of Byron, Bill Rehnquist and
mine.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.§u:µuntt QJnttri of tltt ~th .§taft.S'

~Ifingfon, ~- C!J.
CHAMBERS

20ffe)l.~

or

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

November 24, 1981

80-419 - ARIZONA v. MARICOPA COUNTY
MEDICAL SOCIETY, ET AL.
Dear Chief,
I would not DIG.
stated my position.

Lewis accurately

Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
cc:
dag

To Conference

-

.iu.prtutt C!Jl!Url 4tf tlrt ~ t b .Statts

jiru4htghnt. ~- C!J. 20p'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 24, 1981
Re:

No. 80-419

Arizona v. Maricopa County

Dear Chief:
I find my notes corresponding very much with those
which Lewis sets forth in his note to you of November 24th,
and although I would be quite willing to dismiss the case
as improvidently granted, I don't think that there are
four of the seven participating Jus t;.,l.-'ees-.Wflre-~~~ -&~.:t..ll
result.
I would be happy to join
short one-paragraph
Per Curiam stating that the action o
· t
our
Iileither granting or denying a motion for partial summary
judgment as to the applicability of the "per se" rule at
the stage of the case it was made was premature, and remand
the case for developments of a further record.
Sincerely,~

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

j\nprmtt <!Jourt of t!ft '1titth ,itatts
~asltinghtn. J. <!J. 2llffe~-'
CHAMBERS OF"

V

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

November 27, 1981

l

Re:

No. 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society

Dear Lewis:
I suggest you undertake to draft a dispositive
Per Curiarn on this case.
Regards,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~-

- - ._..

-

..

..~·

:

~~

.-

'

~f CkJ·~ o L(At>vl '2.ev,ew ·1/d·<'I .· ·

.
~

'

-Rtfl

I

'i~I_. ( ft>~ t"-co~r~)

-~ I
- -2~-Juo
- -- Sl- -Ol----:--:----- - - - - - - - ; - SEQ:
- : 1-I -I- - - ~ :4b STYLE: SY:(STYLES)CHJ.tµfCl,ll
FILE: SY:<DARBY2)Bb702(70,22)
't

cirby

I

OPERATOR:fhs

I'"'~-

Maximum Price Fixing
Frank H. Easterbrookt
r

If all of the grocers in a city agreed to sell 100-watt light bulbs
for no more than fifty cents, that would be maximum pric~· fixing.
If a group of optometrists agreed to charge no more than $30 for
an eye examination and to display a distinctive symbol on the
shop3 of parties to the agreement, that would be maximum price
fixi;.1g. And if most of the physicians in a city, acting through a
nonprofit association, offered to treat patients for no more than a
given price if insurance companies would agree to pay the fee, that
agreement would bs maximum price fixing too.
A maximum price a~pears to be a boon for consumers. The
optometris:s' symbol, for exampl?., helps consumers find iow-cost
·1ppliers of the service. But foe 2.greement also appears to run
j.'oul of the rule agai!lst p:ice fixing, under which "a combination
- formed for the purpose ::,r}d with t!-!e effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizi!lg the price of a commodity ... is illegal per s e." 1
This rule might be read as banning only those price agreements that reduce the allocative efficiency of the economy: monopolistic price increa:;es and monopsonistic price decreases. In eithel'
of these cases, a price agreemtnt drives a wedge between the competitive price and the market price_kto the detriment of efficiency.
On the other ha.nd, if a maximum price agreement serves only to
supply information to consumers about where bargains can be had,
or to overcome conditions that have elevated price above marginal
cost, the objections to monopoly and monopsony do not apply.
The Supreme Court has been of two minds about arguments
of this sort. On the one hand, it has said that the benefits of price
agreements are irrelevant. "Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does

T
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1 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (also known ns
Madison Oil).
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not permit an inquiry into reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy." 2 It has applied this rationale to hold maximum price agreements unlawful in Kiefer-Stewart Co. u. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 3 and Albrecht v. Herald Co. 4 At the same
time, the Court regularly sustains business ventures that engage in
price fixing far more successfully than any cartel. Mergers, joint
ventures, partnerships, and similar organizations suppres~· price
competition internally to organize production through other
means. These arrangements could be banned as price fixing, but
they are not. To call something "price fixing" therefore does not
assist in analysis; "price fixing" is no more than a label given to
arrangements that have been found unlawful per se. 6 It is necessary to examine a given arrangement's probable effects before attaching this fatal label. The Court has been willing in recent years
to conduct such examinations to determine which arrangements
are most beneficial to consumers. 6 I argue in this article that maximum price fixing is almost always beneficial to consumers, and the
+ime has come to abandon any per se rule against the practice.

I. KIEFER-STEWART

A~D

. ~·..

ALBRECHT .,

The examples of maximum price fixing given in the fi st paragraph of this article involved cooperation among compet· ors._Both
o the Court's decisions on maximum price fixing, oweve~
volved ver 1 :a:I restnc1ions: ,r~ ale price maintena . In KieferStewar~ two affiliated liquor distillerT1ns1sted that their wholesale
customers reduce the price at which liquor was furnished to retailers, In Albr,ech~ a newspaper insisted that its distributor reduce
the price charged to subscribers. The distillers and the newspaper
were buying distribution services, and the cost of distribution was
the difference between the initial price and the "fixed" resale price.
2 Id. at 226 n.59. See also Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647-48
(1980).
3 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
4 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
5 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979).
6 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (~ legislative history of the Sher- .-.S-man Act "suggest[s] that Congress designed [it] . . . as ol consumer welfare prescription'") V:.
(quoting R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-9, 19-20 (1979); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs ·
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-92 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania( Inc., ~
433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488
(1977).
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It is possible to see both cases as monopsony problems, with the
seller attempting to monopsonize distribution; it is possible, too, to
interpret the cases as boycotts, subject to scrutiny accordingly. 7
Horizontal maximum price fixing does not involve either of these
i
problems.
It is unnecessary, however, to hunt for strained distinctions to
argue that Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht should not be controlling
in maximum price fixing cases. Both cases invoked rationales that
have since been repudiated by the Court. Kiefer-Stewart disposed
of the antitrust arguments laconically, stating that maximum price
agreements, "no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the
freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment."8 Albrecht repeated this
theme. 9 But the "freedom of tradersf has nothing to do with con- ~
sumers' welfare. The emphasis on 'freedom of traders" in these
cases recalls the remark of the Court in the Schwinn case that restricted distribution practices limit "the retailer's freedom as to
where a...11d to whom it will resell the products" 10 and so "violate
the ancient rule against restraints on alienation." 11 The Supreme
Court has overruled Schwinn and explicitly rejected any analysis
that makes antitrust cases turn on the "autonomy of independent
businessmen."u Arguments about the effect of a practice on quantity and price, not arguments about freedom and autonomyt control antitrust analysis.
Kiefer-Stewart contains no arguments about price or quantity.
Albrecht does. The,( Court asserted that maximum price agree- © Alb'l".ec.1-lt
ments substitute "the perhaps erroneous judgment of the seller for
/ ·the forces of the competitive market" and thus reduce "the ability
of buyers to compete and survive in that market.,, 13 This is really

7 Although such interpretations are possible, they are not plausible. The sellers have no
incentive to monopsonize distribution, for that just dries up the supply of distributors and
preventa the seller from disseminating its product. Moreover, the characterization of the
acts as "boycotts" does not help us to decide whether the maximum price fixing is deairable.
8 340 U.S. at 213.
9 390 U.S. at 1.52.
10 United Stati,s v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 378 (1977).
11 Id. nt 380.
~
.
12 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvanial Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (Hl77). Justice
White, the author of Albrecht, objected to this aspect of the GTE Sylvania decision, calling
it inconsistent with Albrecht. Id. at 66-70 (White, J., concurring).
13 390 U.S. at 152. See also id. at 153 ("[m]aximuro price fixing may channel distribution through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers"-epparently describing dealers
who can distribute the product at lower coat).
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two arguments. First, it asserts that sellers 111ay err in establishing
a price. This is irrelevant to antitrust policy; a single firm also may
err in setting its own price, but this has never been thought to call
for condemnation, even when the error-prone firm is a monopolist.
Because the market penalizes errors, firms eventually will correct
their mistakes or suffer ~sequences. The second argument,
concerns the effect on buyers and reflects solicitude for competitors, as distinct from competition. This approach is no more helpful in evaluating the practice than is solicitude for the freedom of
traders.,. The only argument in Albrecht that concerns competition is the assertion that the maximum price will soon become the
minimum price, and then the arrangement will acquire the defects
of a cartel. 15 Perhaps so; I consider this possibility in Part III-A.
But the Albrecht opinion simply asserts the conclusion. It provides
no a:gument that this is likely or, if likely, undesirable.
The s:1allo..,.-:ness of the reasoning in Albrecht suggests that its
rule sh.oulci be examined more closely. The Court has emphasized
in recent years that per se rules should be employed only after
thorough study and considerable experience have led to a conclusion that almost every instance of the practice sought to be condemned is harmful, so that there is no point in attempting to separate the harmful insta..rices from the harmless or beneficial ones in
case after case. 16 Per se rules are uaed, in other words, 1.o hold as
low as possible the sum of the welfare losses from the practice and
the costs of litigating about it. 17 There is no reasorr to have a per se
14 See Bruns.,..ick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (the
Sherman Act protect3 "competition, not competitors") (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
15 390 U.S. et 152.
16 See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649 (1980) (per se rule
applies if "a particular concerted activity entails an obviou~ risk of anticompetitive impact
with no apparent potentially redeeming value"); Broadcast Music, lnc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9-10, 19 & n.33, 22 n.40 (1979) (emphasizing need for "considerable" experience with a practice before per se con<lemnatiorft' and remnrking on role of
output reduction as trigger for a per se rule); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1978) (the per se rule appli<,s only to agreements "whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive th!'tt no elaborate study of the industry is needed"); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvaniao/ Tnc., 433 U.S. 36, f,O n.16 (1977) (in
establishing per se rules, "[t]he probability that antic.ompetitive consequence~ will result
from a practice and the severity of those consequences musl. be balanced against its procompetitive consequences. . . . [A] per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not
a~fficihtly common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify
the .")
17 See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Co1interstrategies, 48 U. Ctn. L. REV.
263, 333-37 (1981); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitru.st Treatment of Restricted Distri-
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FUNCTIONS OP MAXIMUM PRICE FIXING

Introduction
In perfect competition firms sell at marginal cost-as low as

bution· Per Se Legality, 48. U. CH1. L. REv. 6, 22-26 (1981).
18 BroP.dcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadca~ting Sy11., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)}.
19 The Court bas hinted that Albrecht is open for reexamination. See Group Life &
Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210 & n.5 (1979) (reserving judgment on
the legality of an agreement to set maximum prices).
20 Maximum resale price fixing has none of the potential anticompetitive consequences
of horizontal maximum price .fixing (see Part III, infra), and so the vertical case can be
resolved more easily. Moreover, maximum resale price fixing has a competitive benefit that
does not occur in cases of horizontal maximum price fixing: the maximum resale price prevents distributors from e:xploiting territories given to them by manufacturers. Distributors
with exclusive territories may attempt to set monopoly prices; maximum resale price maintenance prevents this. Because it iH lawful to grant exclusive territories, it also should be
lawful to place on the grant such conditions as are reasonably likely to aid consumers. These
a n<! other argument.3 about maximum resale pr:ce fodng have been mode cogently_eJsewhere,
and there is little point in repeating the an11lysis here. See Albrecht v. Herald Cf Co., 390
U.S. 145, 165-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 168-70 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (1968); 3 P. AREF:DA
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 11 734e (1978); R. BORK, supra note G, at 435-39 ~ R.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 11i8 (1976). See also Eastern Scientific
Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d SSJ (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833
(1978), for a convincing argument that resale price fi~ng is not unlawful, even under Albrecht, when used as 11n ancillary device to implement territorial allocations.
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rule unless the Court is confident that "the effect and, . . . because
it tends to show effect, . . . the purpose of the practice are to
threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free-market
economy-that is, [that] the practice facially appears to be one
that would always o~ almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output, ... or instead one designed toCJ{ncrease eco- ~ '& 'O.
nomic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.' " 18
The Court has ) ever attempted to determine whether maxi- h -:.
mum price fixing would almost always "tend to restrict competition and decrease output" or "increase economic efficiency" instead. Just as Schwinn was not the last word on restricted
/
distribution practices, so Albrecht cannot be the last word on max1
imum price fixing. 10 h a,d~ ~o explore the *'1- of maximum® .))-1 Cnf' ,
price fixing, I concentrate in this al'ticle on agreements among
·
competitors, disregarding vertical restricted distribution arrangements. If such horizontal agreements have benefits that make application of a per se rule inappropriate, restricted distribution
cases can be disposed of without further ado. 20
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the most efficient method of production will allow. An agreement
to charge a maximum price lower than marginal cost would cause a
reduction in allocative efficiency. Such a possibility is of little legal
interest, however, because firms usually can be counted on to protect their own interests. If price falls below marginal cost, they can
make more money by increasing price. An agreement calling for
sales at less than marginal cost consequently would be unstable.
Firms would raise prices as soon as they discovered the error.
There is no reason for antitrust law to penalize blunders of this
sort; the firms bear as private losses any damage done by their
prices, and blunders thus are self-deterring.z 1
A mEimum price agreement ~g_~ a conspiracy to charge a
predatory price, but here too there is no reason for concern. Predation does not work unless the predator, having driven rivals from
the market, can raise its price and recoup its investment in predation through monopoly overcharges. A "conspiracy to predate"
through maximum prices would be absurd. Even if the
predetors--the firms subscribing to the maximum price agreement-could drive rivals from the market, they could not recoup
their investment. The participants in the price reduction agreement would begin to compete against one another once price rose.
Only a minimum price fixing agreement; a cartel, would make re-coupment possible. But such a cartel could be detected and prosecuted under standard antitrust rules, and the damages award
would prevent the conspirators from recouping. There is no reason
to proceed against a maximum price agreement that has not produced-and probably never could produce-a recoupment cartel.?. 2
There are thus only two cases about which we must be concerned. It is possible ifi'af the maximum pnce agreement is a disguise for a more traditional cartel, in which event the agreement
should be held unlawful. It is also possible that without the agreement, price would exceed marginal cost; ~the maximum price
agreement ~drives price back toward marginal cost or, perhaps,
reduces marginal cost. If a maximum price agreement has either
effect, we *ould count ourselves fortunate; condemnation is out of
the question. But at least at first glance, it is hard to see why sellers who can obtain a price exceeding marginal cost would agree to
21 See Easterbrook, supra note , nt 278-81, for a more complete expl1111ation of why
prices et less than marginal cost nre self-deterring.
22 See id. at 331-33 for an argument that only a person who pays the overcharge should
be permitted to bring a predatory prich,g suit.
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charge less, or how sellers can reduce their costs by acting collec- ·
tively. If sellers have no plausible-that is, profitable-reason for
reducing their prices, we may infer that any given maximum price
agreement is actually a traditional cartel in disguise. To understand the function of a maximum price agreementr then, we must
ask how firms can profit by reducing price. :
B. Searching for Low-Price Sellers
One important discovery of the economics of information is
that the cost of searching for low-price sellers affects the price sellers will charge. 23 The more costly the search, the more likely it is
that any given seller will be able to set a price exceeding marginal
cost. Whe'I.. a. buyer does not know what price each seller charges, -.=. I'\
he must go from seller to seller seeking information. Every visit
entails a cost: the searcher's own time is valuable, transportation is
costly, and delay in making the purchase also may be costly. Sellers can take advantage of this. If, for example, the marginal cost of
a widget is SlOO, a..11d a prospective searcher incurs a cost of $5 to
learn the price at any store, the merchant can set a price of at least
$105 for his widget, if he knows consumers' search costs. Even if
the consumer knows that widgets are available somewhere for
$100, he would pay $105 if that were the price at the first store he
visited. If he refused the offer, he would incur a cost of $5 to make
another check and even then might not get a qu€>te of $100. If
every seller is charging $105, none has an incentive to reduce the
price to $100, because the reduction would not generate additional
business. (Every buyer . visits only one store.) If search costs fall,
h " wever, so does the price.
Not all buyers have the same search costs. Those with lower
costs will look at more than one price. These searchers enable some
merchants to increase their volume by reducing prices; low-cost
searchers might keep trying until they found widgets for $102, and
stores that reduced price to this level might experience an increase
in sales that more than offsetl the lower per sale profit. In sense, cs
these low-cost shoppers protect the high-cost shoppers. If substanti al numbers of people do not do much searching, however, many
sellers will find it advantageous to set a price above marginal

a

c:ost. 2 •
23 Schwartz & Wilde, lnteruening in Markets on the Basis of. Imperfect Information :
A l,egal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979), sumnrnrizes much of the
ero1 ,,.,1oic literature.
24 This principle was exploited by the defendant.; in National Soc'y of Professional
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Advertisements are one way low-price selleni can identify
themselves. The Supreme Court has recognized whai studies. show:
advertising leads to lower prices by reducing the cost of finding
low-price sellers, 211 Advertisements are less effective in reducing
price, however, if buyers are uncertain about the quality of the
product (the advertised price might represen1, just an inferior sample) and if the seller who advertises canncit. expand his output
(much) at the low price. In the latter case the advertising sellers
will not draw much business from the quiet sellers, who can continue to charge a price exceeding marginal cost. Moreover, if a
third party and not the searcher pays for the product, price advertising may be pointless. The rational comumer, assured of thirdparty payment, will ignore the advertisements and go to the seller
who offers the highest quality, or perhaps simply to the first seller.
We th£:refore would expect significant price dispersion and many
sales at prices exc~ding marginal cost \vhenever search is costly or
infrequent, quality uncertain, and the consumer does not pay for
the purchase. 2 ~
A maxir;:n.1.!TI price egreement can help to 1educe search costs.
Sellers \ .:ould find the milimum price useful for the same reason
they find advertisi1;.g useful. Those adhering io the agreement are
identified as low-price sellers, and this identification should lead to
an increase in the sales by those so identified. Maximum (list)
0

& ~ eept. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). The society adopted a rule prohibiting
competitive bids. Purchasers oi engineering~ onsequently h11d to go from engineer to engineer, seeking a price from each one in sequence. Because each engineer might take weeks or
months to exar;:iine the specifications and submit a price, the c:ost of each search W9.S high.
The society admitted, and the Court assumed, that this st.rategy raised prices. Justice
-Blackmu~ explicitly observed that the costs of searching were _the cau~e of the higher
prices. Id. at 700 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
25 Bates v_ State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 377 (1977). See cdso Benham & Benham, Regulating Through the Professions: A Perspectiue on. Information Control, 18 J. L.
& EcoN. 421 {1975); Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J_ L.
& EcoN. 337 (1972); J. Kwoka, Advertising, Quality, and Price: A Model nnd Evidenc--e from
Professional Services (Feb. 19, 1981) (paper presented at the Jnduslrial Org11nization Workshop, University of Chicago) (on file with The University of Chicago Lnw -ll{d>. While advertising sometimes may lead to price increases when it serves ns a signal of consistent quality, the consumer in this case places on the signal a value greater than thE: price increase.
See R. POSNER & F_ EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 511-16 (2d ed. 1981 ).
26 See Salop & Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs, 44 REV. ECON. Snm. 493 (1977). See also
Newhouse & Sloan, Physician Pricing.- Monopolistic or Competitive: Reply, 38 S. EcoN. J.
577 (1972) (finding substantial price variance in market for physicians' services, n market
~
by quality uncertainty, lack of advertising, nnd third-p11rly paymenl). See also Hey
& MclCenna, Consumer Search with Uncertain Product ~a/ity, 89 J_ Pm.. Eco:-<. 54 ( 1981 );
Schwartz & Wilde, supra note , at 650-51, 662-63, 672-73.
1
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prices are used this way by many manufacturers and dealers. This
benefit is sufficiently plain that even the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department has pointed to it as a justification for a maxi--'
mum price agreement.:n
These principles a.re quite abstract, so it ~ _b_e_h~lpfu_!~p
pl~m to an exis!!.._I1g__maximum price agreement. The Maricopa
FoundationforMedical ~anonprofitassociation that acts as
egent for both physicians and insurance companies. Any physician
i~ aricopa Countymay join; approximately seventy percent have
done so. The foundation proposes maximum 'prices for medical services. In exchange for the insurers' agreement to pay the price for
services, the member physicians undertake not to seek any additional payment from the patients. In Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society,2 8 the Ninth Circuit held that this arrangement is
not unlawful per se as price fixing.
4

~

Medical services are a textbook example of goods in which
quality is tL.'1certain, search costs are high (patients sometimes cannot search at all), purchases are infrequent, and third-party payments reduce the incentive for patients t.o search even when they
can do so at low cost. A maximum price agreement may identify
low-price sellers to the insurance companies, which may instruct
the insureds to use a member of the foundation for medical care.
Insurers participating in the plan will have lower costs, and the
insureds wili pay lower premiums. Physicians willing to accept the
established maximum may join the foundation; others will not do
so. The process should lead to a reductio_!l in the cost of servic~
satisfyingthe criteria set out in the i n t r o d u ~ h e
article: the maximum price agreement makes both consumers and
the participating sellers ~etter off. I consider in Part III whether
there is a more sinister explanation for medical foundations of this

J

.27 Brief for the United Statet< as Amicus Curiae at 10-14, Group Life & Health Ins. Co.
v. Royal Drug Co., ~40 U.S. 205 (1979).-Set irl. at 11 -~ (A maximum price agreement
"help!s] the policyholders find low-overhead pharmacies with which to deal. Moreover, it
provides pharmaci es with incentives to reduce their distribution costs in order to be able to
take advantage of [the maximum price] and still make a profit.' . Grau Li e involve
maximum price schedule announced by ~-~ of services; in Part III-A, I consider
whether sellers' agreements should be treated differently.
28 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1 981). The stated facts
appear in the opinion with one exception: the seventy percent membership estimate is in
the appellate record at 7(a) ~ 106.
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sort. 29
C.

Reducing Transactions Costs
:
In some markets the costs of striking an agreement may be
very high in relation to the value of the good. The market in musical performing rights is an example. Radio and television stations
play thousands of copyrighted songs and jingles daily, sometimes
not deciding what to play until moments before airtime. The market would break down if a license had to be negotiated for each
use. The costs of negotiation would be substantial, the costs of delay or advance planning large, and the costs of composers' listening
to every program to ensure that no unlicensed music was used incalculable. Composers therefore have formed performing rights societies, which grant "blanket" licenses to users of music. The blanket licenses are price fixing in a technical sense-the competing
copyright holders ag:;:-ee on a price for the licEmse and divide the
proceeds-but the agreement unquestional>1y increases allocative
efficiency. The societies cannot charge more for the license than
the licecsa 2~11d t:ansactions costs that would be incurred by the
users if they obtained individual licenses. The users' preference for
~blanket liceme~establishes that they are beneficial, and the Su- "?r- /
preme Court has held that they are not unlawful per se despite the
existe:ice of price fixing. 30
29 Kall5trom, Health Ccre Cos: Control by Third Party Payors: Fee Schedules and
the Sherman Act, 1978 DuKZ L .J. 645, 678-84; Meeks, Antitrust Aspects of Prepaid Legal
Services Plans, 1976 Al.!. BAR FousDATlON RESEARCH LT. 855, 882-84; and Note, Antitrust
and Nonprofi t Entities, 94 HARV. L_ REY. 802, 811-16 (1981 ), ta ke somewhat different views
of the functi ons of profesaional care foundations. Kallstrom nrgues that maximum price
fixing by ph~icians should be unla ..iul because it creates too much risk of cartelization; he
recommends that maximum prices be permitted only if insurance companies promulgate the
5Chedules. I consider this ar
ent in Part III-A. Meeks, on the other hand, sees maximum
pdce fixing e.s el truism by attorney ; he believes that it is beneficial because the attorneys
-will furnish serv1ces for less than the competitive rate. This is implausible; there is no need
to rely on supposed altruism to understand why ma.'timum prices_benefit consumers. The
Harvard Note apparently would find maximum price schedules unlawful but for the nonprofit status of the foundations; given the nonprofit statu8, the student author maintains,
the foundations should be allowed to set maximum fees if t.hat. will overcome some market
failure. There is, however, no reason why tli a R ~ , Q ~ status of the foundations should
have any effect on antitrust analysis. Trade associations and joint ventures often are non profit associations, yet their activities have been scrutinized under the usual antitrust standards. And it would be inappropriate to call search costs "market failures." They nre simply
costs, much as medical education is a cost. That sellers can find a way to reduce these costs
does not imply th at a "failure" has been "overcome." Se e Demsetz, Information nnd Efficiency: Anoth er Viewpoint, 12 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1969).
30 Broadcast Mu3ic, Inc. v. Columbitt Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. J (1979). The
Court pointed out that rather than acting as a "naked restraint," the blanket license re-
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Performing rights licenses are an extreme case, but the princi- (
ple is perfectly general. C~ative behavior often reduces costs.
The cooperation in a legal partnership or a corporation is an example. Maximum price agreements may be another. In the example of
the optometrists given at the beginning of this article, the maximum price agreement served as a basis for price advertising
(through the distinctive symbol), and such advertising may be less
costly and more effective than advertisements placed by many individual optometrists.
.
_
The same can be said of the ~ axirnum rice a reement in
Mar~ _) ons1 er e cos o reac mg pnce agreE:ments in every
"c~Consumers must take on faith much of what their physicians
tell them, and it is often hard for physicians even io describe their
product. Pa2 ents would have to educate themselves to a considerable deg;:ee to k.i."low what tney should Se willing to pay forl given
service. T he physicia..:.-i, as well as the consumer, may be ignorant of
the relevant cos ts and benefits of service. Young physicians in particular would r.ot know appropriate charges.5 1 They could, of
course, pick prices arbitrarily and see how many patients refused
treatment; pe.tie:1t.s b turn could attempt to learn something about
medicine s1d seek quotes from several physicians. But the costs of
such a trial- a..'1d-error process would be high.
There is, moreover, a need for emergency service. Patients
may be unconscious or in no position to negotiate. Or after ~ ment begins, 1t may become C ear that t e
more complicated thsn the parties first supposed. If the physician first renders
service and then attempts to name a price, the parties are locked
into a bilateral monopoly; the physician ,x..·ill name a high price and
the patient a low one, and because the service has been performed,
neither has much incentive to compromise. ~ the law of restitution supplies an off-the-shelf answer to this impasse, it may be

case is

duced the costs of transacting licenses and monitoring performers. Id. at 20-22. On remand,
the court of appeals applied the Rule of Reason and found the blanket license lawful. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Sec'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 620
F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1491 (1981). S ee also K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin
Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 10-15 (1968) (su stoining
blanket li cense).
31 ~
Eisenberg, Information Exchange Among Competitors: The Issue of Relative
Va lue Scales for Physicians' Services, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 441 (1980), for o description of the
pn ,blems in setting prices for medical services. The costa of price-set.ting by individual phy11icians are especially high if, ns sometimes occurs, the physicions attempt to size up their
patients and charge more to the wealthier. See Kessel, Price Discriminntion in Medicine, 1
J .L. & EcoN . 20 (1958).
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quite costly to apply the legal principles. A price schedule that allows instantaneous service is one of the benefits of performing
rights societies, and this holds for maximum price fixing as well.
W1!._en third parties such
insurance companies P!!Y for_ the
service, the~ ransacUons costs of reaching a price agreement be; : -especially high. The insured person has no reason to ;eek
lo~rice suppliers. Instead, he will seek the highest quality supplier for which the insurer will pay. 82 The insurer must attempt to
police price agreements between patient and physician. It may
limit fees to customary charges for average-quality providers, investigate bills to determine whether the service was warranted, and
so forth. But these measures are costly and apt to be ineffective. 53
Once the service has been performed, the professional (whether
physicia11 or auto-body rebuilder) has control of the relevant information 2.nd can plausibly insist that the service was necessary and
the fo-:: justified by the complexity of the task. The adoption of a
maximum fee schedule reduces these costs of supervision. The insurer can offer io~:er rates, and the providers can save the hours
they 'l!sed to spend filling out forms justifyfog the service and fees.
'J'he fees ea.med duri:ig these released hours ee~ily could compensate for the lower fee per treatment, making the maximum price
schedule profitable to all parties.
It might seem that the cost reductions come from the existence of any fee schedule and are not specific to maximum price
fixing by suppliers. Insurance compa...-1ies would be an alternate
source of price schedules. Insurers, however, do not necessarily

32 Even the process_pf searching for high quality sellers may be inefficient. The developing economics of signalling suggests that sellers attempt to send ''signals" about the quality of their wares, and that the signalling is wasteful because it is offset by other resources.
See, e.g.. Hirshfleifer & Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information-An Expository Suruey, 17 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1375, 1389;.l)_I (1979) (collecting sources). Markets
often develop methods to suppress wasteful signainng nnd inefficient sorting. See Barze!,
Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 291, 301 -05
(1977). Maximum price agreements may serve such n function . Suppliers who cannot send
signals that identify their quality at I~ cost would join the maximum price group, which
can reduce its price by the Sflved signalling costs; suppliers who Cflll identify their quality at
lower cost will stay out of the group and sell n distinctive product r.t n different price.
33 Auger [,. Goldberg, Prepaid Health Plans and Moral Hazard, 22 Pua. PoL'v 353
(1974), describes the costs of systems that attempt. t.o set price nfter the service has been
tendered. See also Posner, Regulatory Aspects of Notional Health lnsurarice Plans, 39 U.
Cm. L. REV. 1 (1971); Spence & Zeckhauser, Jnsurnnce, Jnfarmation, and lndiuidtwl Action, 61 AM. EcoN. REV. 380 (1971); Zecklurnser, Medical lrisurance: A Case Study of the
Tradeoff Between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Inccntiues, 2 J. EcoN. THEORY 10
(1970),
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have as much information as suppliers' groups about the relative
costs and difficulties of particular services. Schedules promulgated
by the insurers therefore are less likely to clear the market. Moreover, maximum price schedules adopted by associations of providers require fewer total transactions. Once the association adopts a
maximum price schedule, each provider and each insurer must
make a single decisioni whether to participate in the program. A
single identifier (for example, "M~mber of the 1\j,!lLicopa Founcta-t i ~ Care") can inform the insureds under many }211:!,ns
whether the provider has agreed to accept fhe insurer's payment.in
sat1s ac ion o
e ee. f eac msurer must promulgate its own
sche u e, owever, ev ry provider must accept. or decline the offer
from every insurer; the number of transactions equals the number
of sellers times the number of insurance plans. 34
The costs of buyer-proposed schedules could be less than the
costs under seller-proposed schedules. When that. is so, we would
observe buyers proposing their schedules and attracting business.
That occurred in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal
Drug Co.,5 3 where Blue Shield proposed a price schedule for prescription drugs and enrolled all pharmacies that would dispense
drugs for cost plt!s a foe of $2. Insurance companies have proposed
schedules for auto body repair as well. But when seJlers propose a
maximum p:ice sch~dule and buyers do not make a counteroffer, it
is fair to conclude that tra..YJ.sactions costs are lower under the sellers' schedule. These savings are quite similar to th~ cost reductions
that led the Supreme Court to conclude in Broadcast ~Music that
· performing rights societies are not unlawful per se despite the
composers' plain agreement on price.
.

-------

D. Creating @._ "New Product"
.
· Price reductions-assoe: ed with lower search and transactions
costs may well accompany any ma.ximum price agreement. Only
.the magnitude of these effects will vary from product to product.
Additional savings may be available under unusual circumstances.
In dealing with the price agreements underlying performing
rights societies, the Court observed that the blanket license was a
distinctive product: it allowed users both great flexibility in choos34 The number of transaction~ could be reduced if the insurers coopernted in proposing
fee schedules. That, however, would substitut~ buyers' cooperation for sellers'. There is no
reason to prefer potential monopsony (buyers' cooperation) to pot.enti11l monopoly (Rellers'
cooperation).
35 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
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ing compositions and the ability to play compositions without de- (
lay. 36 This recognition that the blanket license offered a new product, one not available without cooperation among copyright
holders, was an element in the Court's conclusion that the blanket
license was not unlawful as price fixing. 37
A maximum price agreement, like the blanket license, changes
the identity of the "product" in at least some cases. The Maricopa
case again provides an example. When consu'mers purchase he~lth
insurance, they obtain protection against at least two kinds of uncertain~ : whether they will need medical assistance and the cost
of the assistance. Some cases will be more difficult than others.
The insurance company usually assumes both risks, but. this may
not always be desirable. If the insurer will pay for any treatment,
however costly, physicians have an incentive t.o provide unwarranted service. The lack of price discipline creates a mora1 hazard
and leads to excessive costs. 38
The _moral hazar_d can be reduced if the physician insures art
of the uncertainty. If thephysician's fee for escn e courses of
treatment is fixed, he loses any incentive to provide unwarranted
Gfil_e.... \Vhen thetreat.:::1ent turns out to be more simple than anticipated, the fixed fee overcompensates the physician for hjs time;
when the case is unusual or complications develop, t.he maximum
t'°
fee underco:::npensates the physician. Spreading t:he risk in this
fashion over ~.mci1eds ta-.thousands of cases is the usual definition
of insurance. 39 Without a maximum price, however, this method of
~~ ~
insurance by physicians
-even if desirable
~
, .t _
because: it reduces costs-would not work as well. An individual
1
.j
/ ~ physician who announced a maximum price would find patients
llV U
a._ith more complex cases more likely to come to him. Patients with

~r

36 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1979).
37 Wheth er it should have been an important element in the decision is open to question. A "new product" is desirable only to the extent it reduces the costs of producing a
service-in Broadcast Music, completed,ltelevision programs. The rost.s of broadcasting
could be reduced in many ways: whether the reduction involves a "new product" is irrelevant. Indeed, economists usually leave the identification of a "product" to popular conven tion, for its definition is simply arbitrary. A "product" is whatever bundle of at.tributes can
be lumped· cunve!liently to ether under a single price and a Ringle name.
38 See note , supra.
39 See, e.g., Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Core, 53 AM.
EcoN. RRv. 941, 962 (1963). The Court employed a similar definition in Group Life & Health
Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211-15 (1979). The dissenters pointed out that risksp!eading through providers is insurance in the economic sense. Id. at 251 (Brennan, ,J.,
dissentin 6).
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simple cases would go to physicians who charged by the hour
rather than by the treatment. In the end, the physician would be
compelled to raise his fixed price until it equaled the expected fee
for the most complex treatments, and the benefits of insurance-byproviders would be lost.' 0 A maximum price agreement among a
substantial number of providers overcomes this sifting mechanism
and preserves the benefits of this insurance device.

III.

~;~,,v-

..

SEQ: 15

ANTICOMPETITIVE EXPLANATIONS OF MAXIMUM PRICE FIXING

I have discussed three ways in which maximum price fixing
could benefit both producers and consumers. These benefits do not
always accompany every maximum price, because a maximum
price agreement might simply be a euphemism for a cartel price. In
the following sections, I discuss some of the less pleasant characterizations of maxi:;:::;J.ll!n price fixing and how beneficial agreements
may ba distinguished from others.
A.

Ce.riels
One way to e.rgue that maximum price agreements are like
c·u-tels is to say that the maximum price will become the minimum
price. lf the ceiling is a floor, the argument runs, there is no difference between the two. ·he Supreme Court in Albrecht• 1 and the
dissenting juc.ge i.n faric pa :i made arguments of this sort.
The analogy i3 not e p ul. Although it is true that if the seller
discovers that consumers will pay the maximum price, he will
charge that price, this tells us little of interest. The seller will
charge what the traffic v.,ill bear whether or not he participates in
an agreement.•s The pertinent question is whether the agreement
enables the seller to charge more than he could obtain without the
I
I
agreement. The argument that the maximum· price becomes the
'
40 The way in which sifting can lead to the collapse of markets is studied in Ackerlof,
7'he Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Marhet Mechanism , 84 Q.J. EcoN.
488 (1970); Rothschild & Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitiue Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. EcoN. 629 (1976).
41 390 U.S. \153.
42 643 F.2dat 567-68 (Larson, J., dissenting).
43 Moreover, the traffic will not always bear the maximum price. Even when third parties pay most of the cost of medical care, for example, the patient mny he rrquired to poy
some portion of the expense. These copayments will induce the patient. to shop for bargains.
In addition, once a price has been set, the consumer will search for higher qtwlity. Lowquality sellers must offer price concessions to obtain business. To equalize quelit.y, younger,
lesi--experienced physicians would work for less, work under the supervision of nnother physician (who would keep part of the fee), or spend more time on each case.
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minimum price does not answer this question. Unless it raises
price, the agreement is either harmless or beneficial.
Sometimes the source of savings from maximum prices is the
identity between maximum and minimum price. The example in
Part II-D illustrating how maximum prices enable suppliers to become insurers shows this principle at work. The equation between
maximum and actual price also accounts for any reduction in
search costs. To say that the maximum pdce becomes the minimum may be to praise the arrangement, not to criticize it.
It is necessary, therefore, to ask more directly whether the
maximum price agreement displays the reduced output and higher
price characteristics of a cartel. The per se rule is no help here
becaus& it avoids any questions concerning the effects of the agreement. The appropriate method is the one used in Broadcast Music. 44 If an axamination of the practice gives sound reasons for
thinking that signific1:.nt efficiencies of t he sort described in Part II
ere at wor~, 2 more detailed inquiry is necessary!r. If such efficiencies are absent , foe arrangement should be found unlawful per se
41t ordif-- to s.void the large litigation costs of searching for small
efficiency gains:' 6
An inqui:y under the Rule of Reason should not however, be
unduly conplex in mcXi::::num price fixing cases. At leas m prmciple, there is an easy test. The court could determine whether the
quantity supplied was higher in markets with maximum price
fixing than in ma!'kets without. 47 Such a direct. comparison, which
may be possible with the aid of econometric tools, 48 answers the
44 441 U.S. at 8-9, 19-20.
45 The qualifi~a~ion-"significa.'1t" efficiencies-is important. Any cartel will reduce
search costs if it i3 enforced. (There ma{',.be offsetting increases-in cost as cartelists attempt
to prevent price cheating by other firmitlJICartels may stabilize sales and improve the quality of information. Under some circumstances the long run gains of these savings could exceed the .allocative losses, See Dewey, Information, Entry, and Welfare: The Case for Collusion, 69 AM. EcoN. R::v. 587 (1979). But antitrust law frequently disregards savings of this
sort, because the conditions necessary to make cartels beneficial i11clude free entry and other
criteria unlihly to prevail in practice; the short term losses almost certainly exceed the
speculative long term gair,s. For the same reason that we ignore information cost justifications for cartels, we should disregard insubstantial efficiences nchievable by maximum price
fixing.
46 Catalano, Inc. v. 'I'!trget Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 648-49 (J 980 .
; Landes & Posner, Market Power in. Anti47 See Easterbrook, supra note , at
trust Cases, 9·1 HARV. L. REV. 937, 972-74 (1981); nnd Posner, The Rllle of Reason and the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. Rr-:v. 1, 17-19
(1977), for suggestions about using quantity and market share changes to assess the legality
of particular practices.
48 See Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 702
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central question about cartels.
(
If it is not possible to determine whether the agreement led to
an increase in output, it becomes necessary to resort to second-best
devices. The theory of cartels advanced by George Stigler and
elaborated by Richard Posner provides a starting point for the inquiry."9 Posner has developed a list of indicia that often distinguish cartels from competition when direct inquiries ("Did they
sign an agreement in a smoke-filled room?!>) are not helpful.
There is no need to recite those criteria here. Several inquiries,
however, hold out special promise of utility in maximum price
agreement cases. It seems most unlikely that a maximum price
agreement is a disguised cartel if the sellers' market is not concentrated. Because it is costly to reach a cartel agreement, and even
more costly to detect and punish cheating, markets with many sellers cannot easily be cartelized. It will always be in the interest of
some sellers to break ,-,ith the cartel, reduce prices, and so claim a
greater s~a.:e of the business. When there are several large buyers,
this cheating could be ei pecially profitable, because the seller can -=- S ~
increase his business dramatically by appealing to a single substantial buyer. Buyers, indeed, have every in centive to encourage
cheating by fun!1elir:g business to sellers who will reduce price.
Considerations of this sort indicate that maximum price fixing will
rarely be a cartel in disguise. It appears in service industries such
as optometry, retail sales, auto repair, and medical care in which
there are hundreds of sellers and insurance CO!npa~ies can funnel
bu.siness to sellers who shave prices.
Some other inquiries also should help to separate cartels from
efficiency-increasing maximum price agreements. If the market
share of the sellers participating in the .agreement is small, they
would not have sufficient market power to affect price, and a cartel
explanation thus is unlikely. If the market .share of the partici-pants is growing, this indicates that the participants in the plan
are not reducing output and so cannot be cartelizing. No cartel can
profit by admitting all comers and doing nothing to halt an increase in output by its members. The behavior of buyers also provides valuable evidence. If buyers readily cooperate in a maximum
(1980). Econometric analysis requires, however, substantial data that may be difficult or
impossible to obtain in particular cases.
49 G. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J . PoL. EcoN. 44 (1964), reprinted in G. STIGLER'. THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 39 (1968); R. PoSNER, supra note ,rt,ot 39-77. S ee also
R. POSNl..:R & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note
at 336-46.
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price arrangement, they must perceive it to be beneficial; if, on the
other hand, large buyers and insurers begin sending orders and insureds to sellers outside the agreement, this wou]d suggest. the existence of a cartel. Finally, we could attempt to make a direct price
comparison. Is the price of participants in the maximum price arrangement lower than the price of nonmembers? The nnswer to
this inquiry could be of ambiguous import_:_Jower prices may be
associated with lower quality-but it is suggestive.t> 0
At least two inquiries, however, would be pointless. Little can
be learned by asking whether sellers or buyers initiated t.he maximum price arrangement. As I have explained, buyer initiation may
be more costly. Maximum price proposals by individual buyers are
not maximum price fixing at all, and such proposals by groups of
buyers (perhaps acting through insurers) simply substitute the
poasibility of monopsony for the possibility of monopoly. 61 Neither
should be preferred to the other.
We also learn little from whether the maximum price arrangement affect3 the nu.:r.her of suppliers. A ,;artel often attracts a
fringe of small, befficient suppliers that prosper only because the
cartel price is h!gher than the more efficient firms' cost. of production. A redt!ction in foe numbar of suppliers thus may nccompany
the restor::tion of co!Ilpctition in a market. But ir. does not follow
that the opening of many new, small firms shows that a cartel is at
work. A new arrange:!!lent such as a maximum price agreement
could ms.ke it possible for new suppliers io compete more effectively with e:stablished fi:ms. 5 ~ A reduction in the numbel' of supplie s could occur just es easily. Perhaps the price schedule has
made ee.ch existing supplier more efficient--for example, t.he physician who is able to see more patients when he stoos filling out as
/ many forms-so that output rises even as the n~
r of sellers

G'\
~

50 In t
Maricopa case hese inquires indicate that the maximum price arrangement
. is not. a carte · disguise. The market share of the medical foundations appears to be large
and growing; insurer$ have participated in the program and do not, apparently, seek to direct their pstients to physicians who do not belong, The pric'Xharged in the program ('the
r,aroe as or lower than the bills submitted by "eighty-five to mnety-five µercent of physicians
in 1v1aricop11 County". 643 F.2d at 555.
51 There is thc-refore no basis for distinguishing a case like Maricopa from ra case like
Royal Drug. In Royal Drug, Blue Shield proposed II prescription drng price of cost plus 11
dispensing fee of $2. 440 U.S. at 209. Blue Shield was acting ns agent for the policyholders,
just as in Maricopa the foundations were acting as agents of physicians.
52 See Ei~enberg, supra note 31, for 1111 argument that relative value scales for physicians are especially valuable to young practitioners who lack the information of their
competitors.
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falls. A Rule of Reason inquiry therefore should disregard changes
in the number of suppliers.
B.

Monopsony ·
If the buyers' side of the market is concentrated and the sellers' side unconcentrated, it is possible that maximum price fixing
is a consequence of monopsony. The inquiries suggested above
could be used to detect monopsony as well ·as monopoly. A price
decrease coupled with a declining output would mark the onset of
monopsony.
Monopsony is inconceivable in most cases. The optometrists
or General Motors dealers who ban~together to advertise a maximum price are not reaching out to subject themselves to monopsony. Even when the buyers' market is concentrated, a monopsony
explanation u.sually is implausible. In ihe case of physicians' maximum fee schedules, for instance, the insurance companies have no
way to mt:.ke a monopsony work. To depress prices they must curte.il pcrcbs.scs; the purchase decision, however, is made by the insured patient, a:1d once the patient has insurance, the marginal
cost of hes::aii:.h care is well below the price paid by the insurer. It is
hardly possible to reduce the consumers' purchases of medical care
by low=ring the prices they pay! Moreover, any group of insurance
compa.-ii~s th~t sought to curtail the use of medical care enough to
depress prices would cause consumers to go elsewhere for insurance, and physicians would withdraw from the plan .. Firms offering
coverage sufficient to purchase the quantity of services patients desired would have an adva..>1tage in selling policies. Thus if the monopsony explanation prevailed, the insurers subscribing to the
maximum price plan would lose market shar.e, as happens when
monopoly is at work. If the share of firms (buyers or sellers) particJpating in the arrangement is increasing, this indicates efficiencycreating behavior rather than monopoly or monopsony.

~d

C. Entry Deterrence
The final objection to maximum price fixing is that it impedes
entry. Indeed, Professor Sullivan says that the "most likely" explanation for maximum prices is that "sellers (in an oligopolistic industry) fear entry if prices go higher and are conspiring to prevent
this."G 3 Sullivan characterizes entry-deterring pricing as a distor53 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 01' ANTITRUST 211 (1977). Sullivan nlso advances, albeit hesitantly, two other objections to maximum price fixing: that maximum
prices will stifle changes in product characteristics nnd will 1locate short supplies on non- C
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tion of the economy's ability to equate supply and demand. Others
have expressed a similar concern;~' it is known in economics as
limit pricing.~~
Those who advance this objection usually do not explain why
lower prices deter entry. If the ma_ximum price is less than marginal cost, the objection is the one usually advanced against predatory pricing. A maximum price less than marginal cost would prevent new entry for as long as the low price prevailed, but
competition would resume as soon as the conspirators raised prices
in an attempt to recoup. If the li:r::1it price exceeds marginal cost,
however, the argument r:::iust be that certain firms, despite being
able to set a monopoly price, have agreed to charge less than the
monopoly price in order:." to :educe the risk of entry.
It is far from clear thn: li;";'">it p:-icing for this latter purpose is
"1desirable. The welfare loss from the entry-deterring price may
a less than the welfare loss from the monopoly price. Even though
the entry-deterring price ,:;,·ill last longer, consumers do not lose as
much in the early years as thay do und-=r monopoly pricing. The
monopoly price attracts relatively inafficient firms, which limit

price grounds. He does not, ho7,eve:, offer any argu:nent to support these concern,. There is

no reason why maximum price agre,e:nents would impede innovation. And Sullivan does not
show bow conspirators could profit by allocating short supplies by quota rather tha;:i by
price. I therefore disregard these potential objections.j.fn analysis of "stabilization carteh,''-agreement..~ to keep pr:ce constant over time despite changes in demand-leads to
the conclusion thJt such agreements sometimes benefit consumers. F.J. SCHERER, .lNnus'l'RIAL MARKl::T ST,WCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERl'ORM.\NCE 216-20 (2d ed. l ~ O). QueJting may
he preferable to price in allocating goods when there are unanticipated changes in demand.
D. Carlton, The Disruptive Effect of Inflation on the Organization of :r,...Iarkets (Mar. 1981)
(paper presented at National Bureau of Economics Conference on Inflation) (on file with
':.'he University of Chicago Law Review).
C.4 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 565-68 (9th Cir. 1980)
(Larson, J. ~ issenting), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981); Kallstrom, supra note 29, at -:: )'
673-84; Hav1ghurst., Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services, 35 LA;v & CoNTEMP. PROB. 716, 768-70 (1970); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 9-10, Maricop~ (''competing doctors have a
7,financial incentive to limit their fees by agreement only if that would limit new entry . . . .
[T]he agrec:ments . . . could be used as devices to impede entry by competing systems of
prepaid health care, such as health maintenance organizations d HMOs'), or to forestall the ,:_~=development of other typ~s of health care systems deemed un te\irahle by physicians operot:ng uncl,<r tlfe currently prevailing methods.").
55 For stl\tements in support of the limit pricing theory, see F.M. Scrnmrn, supra note
at 2::12-52)..and Gaskins, Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing Under Threat of En3 J. EcoN. Tm:ORY 306 (1971). For discussions by non-believers see Easterbrook, supra
At' ~
nt 296-97; McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. ~ & EcoN. 289, 307-16
( :'.180); PRshiginn, Limit Price and the Marhet Share of the Leading Firm, 16 J. INDUS.
::.:toi.. 1G5 (1968).
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59 The' reasons for my doubt.~ are elaborated in the articles cited in note
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supra. -
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r,
M 510 F.2d 894 (lOfo Cir.), cert. dismissed, l
-----....
57 L. SULIVAN, supra note , at 211)423 -U.8.802 (197'5},appearCTo hold that a mo- \
~olist may eligage in fimiCpricin·g.--- - -·
- ss7Jn·Trie-coilcritionstlial generate monopoly profits or support tacit collusion, see
Land1.:s & Posner, supra note ~ see also R. POSNER & F. EASTERRROOK, supra note ~ 2.5>

331-46.
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pncmg excludes. The productive inefficiencies of these firms are
among the costs of monopoly. An argument that an industry prone
to cartelization should be prevented from engaging in limit pricing
thus is open to question. 66
Even if limit pricing is harmful, though, it is rare. Someone
who maintains that a maximum price agreement is an example of
entry-deterring pricing must establish that (1) the firms could have
charged a monopoly price; (2) the limit price retards entry; and (3)
buyers cannot maneuver around the limit price. None of these
demonstrations is easy.
.
1. lvfonopoly Price. Sellers ordinarily can charge a monopoly
price only if the market is concentrated. Sullivan explicitly qualifies his objection to maximum prices with a reference to oligopoly. 57 If the sellers' market does not contain a dominant firm, a
cartel, or oligopolists engaged in tacit collusion, there is no reason
to worry that maximum price agreements amount to a forbearance
to collect a monopoly price.!',11 Yet most of the examples of maximum price agreements involve rnar~ets that are unconcentrated on
the sellers' side, such e..s nedical s~rvices and retail sales.
2. Limit Price and Entry. Limit pricing usually does not
,imit entry. Firms C8-'1 sbw down entry by charging a price less
than the monopoly price b'.lt more t!:a..'1 the competitive price only
if either the industry has significa..-,t economies of scale, or the pot ential entrants have costs higher than the incumbents (for example, if there is a barrier to entry). Economies of scale slow down
entry because a new firm must build a ph.'1t
. big enough to produce
a significant fraction of the industry's output. This is a risky ven-=
ture, and existing firms ca..'1 make it more risky by holding capacity
in reserve at the limit price. They effectively set a trap for en. trants, ready to pounce if entry takes place. If there are barriers to
entry, incumbent firms can protect their markets by charging
slightly more than the costs the entrant would incur.
I doubt that limit pricing restricts entry even when there are
economies of scale.e1 9 Moreover, it is unlikely that incumbent firms
engaged in limit pricing can make a profit larger than if they just

53
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set the monopoly price and let entry occur naturally. But one can
reject Sullivan's concern even if one does not share my doubts.
Sellers that employ maximum price agreements do not have significant scale economies. The agreements are used in markets where
each seller has only a trivial share. Moreover, those who express
concern about maximum price fixing do not seem to believe that
the agreements impede entry by noble but less efficient rivals. The
argument seems to be, rather, that the "excluded" potential entrants (such as health maintenance organizations or other prepaid
health plans) are more efficient tha."'1 those doing the "excluding"
(such as physicians engaged in fee-for-service practice). This is impossible. No system of limit prices can exclude competition by
more efficient rivals. The only way for the incumbents (in an industry without scale economies) to limit entry is to reduce their
prices to the cCP.3ts of the potential entrants. And if the entrants'
costs are lower th:ir1 the incumbents', the incumbents will go broke.
3. B:.1-yers and the Limit Price. Buyers can foil most limit
prici!'lg scheoes based on scale economies by signing Jong-term
contracts with entr~nts. 60 Because the limit price exceeds the rival's cost, 2-..11d the only thing keeping the rivals out of the market
is the risk that the incumbent.; will sell first and leave the entrant
·with insufficient demand to support the business and reap the
economies of scale, cmtomers ca.ri help rivals by guaranteeing them
sufficient demand to reach efficient scales of production. If customers are willing to help entrants in this way, incumbents can deter
entry only by cha:::-ging the competitive price. Limit pricing by phy- ~
sicians overcome by insurance companies"'spon- ~
soring rival forms of practice. 61
i
I
In sum, the argument that maximum price agreements deter
entry is ridiculouswnen refern ng to more efficient potential entrants ancl impl~sib1e when referring to entrants that must operate at a certain minimum scale to be efficient. It can safely be disregarded as a source of antitrust concern.

CO See Easterbroo\t, supra note , at 270-71, 287, 293-94, for a discussion of the role of
long-term contracts in overcoming ontry-deterring strat!'gies.
61 For example, insurers could establish the ir own health maintenance organizations.
Lo:-ig term contracts between the insurers and th e HMOs would assure the survival of this
form of practice, end if HMOs' costs are lower than the cost.~ of traditional prnctice, the
insurers would have no difficulty signing up customers. Thus entry would occur-indeed be
encouraged- despite limit pricing.
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HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS AND THE PER SE RULE

The Supreme Court invented the per se rule against price
fixing to deal with the argument, frequently advanced by cartelists
in earlier years, that the agreed-on price was "reasonable" and
therefore legal. The Court replied that the reasonableness of the ~ ' )
price is irrelevant in a cartel case.62 It was surely ise to refuse to ~
entertain such reasonableness arguments.
price is reasonable
only in relation to marginal cost at the competitive output, and the
objection to cartels is that they reduce output to Jess than the
competitive quantity. No cartel price is reasonable in an economic
sense. Even if the Court were prepared to undertake the heroic
task of determining the variance between the competitive price
and the cartel price, it would have no ground fo r saying that a particular deviation was acceptable. An argument that a cutback in
output and a "reasonable" price increase are justified by some
other purpose would be "nothing less than a frontal assault on the
basic policy of the Sherman Act. . .. [T] he statutory policy precludes inquizy into t he question whether competition is good or
bad." 6 3
.But ~ £11~ it rejected the cartels' attempts to argue the reason- A1-ti-.ov~'-'.
~bleness of their prices, the Court accepted the proposition that
not all cooperative behavior is unlawful. United S tates v. A ddyston Pipe & Steel Co.M recognized that restrain ts "ancillary" to
lawful, productive conduct a.re themselves lawful. Sometimes these
ancillary restraints entailed cooperation among competitors, but
the cooperation was not subject to automatic condemnation. The
Court's announcement in the Madison Oil case 6 ~ that the law does
not permit any inquiry- into the economic justification for cooperation among rivals therefore reversed a longstanding approach to
the per se doctrine. The Court did not cite Addyston or discuss the
rationale (if there was one) for expanding per-se treatment from a
rejection of "reasonableness-of-price" arguments to a rejection of
all conceivable arguments. It simply asserted the conclusion.
The approach· of Madison Oil led to the per se condemnation
of a wide variety of practices, including all sorts of cooperation

62 See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392~ 1927); United St.ates
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290k 1897).
63 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
6-i 85 F. 271U6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 21l (1899).
65 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940).
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among partially integrated firms. 66 But it is impossible to justify a
rule that refuses to examine the benefits of particular arrangements, no matter how substantial those benefits may be. The Suk -:: r ~
reme Court has never taken the per se rule as seriously as its statements might imply-consider the fate of at.torneys who join in a
partnership and agree on hourly fees for the1.r services-and in recent cases, the Court has revived the earlier approach, so that substantial savings from cooperative endeavors avoid per se condemnation. The approval of the blanket license for musical
compositions
the most vivid example. 67 Sometimes Addyston's \ S
ancillary restraint test will help a court identify those arrangements so likely to benefit consumers that more detailed scrutiny is
desi:able. Sometimes such identifiable benefits will exist independenti of a.,.--:y "a_ncill;:.ry" arrangement among the competitors. -::- I~
Surely nothing should turn on the existence of an ancillary arra..,gene:.;t; the pertinent question is whether the prosptci of consumer benefits is su£5cient for a court to attempt the difficult and
costly inquiry inio their existence.
The costs of trying to separate beneficial 2greements among
competitors from anticompetitive agreements are large; one particular cost is the chance of error. Thus trivial savings are not enough
to initiate an inquiry. The fact that cartels may save on selling
costs by using a joint sales agent, for example,. would not be
enough to avoid the per se rule absent proof of some dramatic
economies of scale in selling; (Such economies are unlikely.) The
fact that a. uniform cartel price reduces consumers' search costs
also would be insufficient to avoid the rule; because cartel members
have an incentive to shave the price and so capture additional
sales, consumers would have an incentive to search for price-cutters, and search costs might even rise as a result. 08 At some point,
though, the savings from cooperation become so large in relation to
the costs of inquiry (including the costs of error) under the Rule of
Reason that there is no longer adequate justification for using per

4f

6 8

66 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596¼1972) (division of terri-z:~ 0
tories incident to trademark promotion by loosely affiliated stores is illegal per se); United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (territorial arrangement involving price restrictions
11nd advertising passover payments among competing manufact.urers of a sirigle brand of
mattress is illegal),
6'7 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Bro11dcasting Sys., Jnc., 441 U.S. J (1979).
~
68 For this reason, Catalano, In~
t Sales, Inc. 446 U.S. 643 1980 is cons·:it~nt ~ }
J/-6'
V.:ith the position I have adopted. ~
1ote
supra, discussing Professor Dewey's O.ct/1,\.
views.
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se rules. I have argued in this article that the balance shifts when
rivals agree to set maximum prices. It should be possible to examine the maximum price agreement and determine with some reliability whether consumers saye or whether, instead, the agreement is a dis~ised cartel. This inquiry may cause aiscomfortt,_.o- those who are used to the idea that all price fixing is unlawful. We
cannot, however, long afford to follow a per se rule that condemns
efficient practices simply because they have names similar to those
of other practices that are more likely to be anticompetitive.
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Memorandum to Justice Powell
Re:

Arizona v. Maricopa County

This draft presents the theory on which I propose this
case

be

decided.

I

would

1 i ke

to

which I will be able to do swiftly.

add

more

case

authority,

But this draft presents my

essential reasoning in as concise a fashion as I have been able
to manage.
I

add

two

think this version

thoughts

for

the

moment.

First,

if

you

is too short, either on facts or on cita-

tions to the record, I can supply either or both of these from
prior (and longer!) drafts.
Second,
curiam.

I

know

I

question

that

is what

whether
the

this

Chief

should

assigned.

opinion as written will be a significant precedent.
has

been

fully

divide 4-3.
dissent.

briefed and argued.

be

a

But

per
this

The case

The Court wi 11 probably

And Justice Stevens probably will write a lengthy

A per curiam label seems anomalous under these cir-

cumstances.
I have given David a copy of this.

I will return from

Havard Monday evening, and plan to have a fully cited version
shortly thereafter.

February 1, 1982
HUNT GINA-POW

To:

John Wiley

From:

L.F.P., Jr.

Subject:

80-419

Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society

I return herewith your draft No. 3 (the first I have
seen), on which I have done my usual editing.

The only

substantial revision was in the latter portion of the
opinion.

My impresssion was that your draft was a bit

repetitive at that point.
Sally has been good enough to make a clean copy that
includes my editing.

I deliver this also.

In the time available to me, I have not gone back and
reread the briefs or even Judge Sneed's opinion - as
normally I like to do.

I assume that you have included or

2.
•

rejected the principal points made by Judge Sneed.
judge whom I respect.

He is a

You may recall that he was _~ ean ~

at Duke before becoming Deputy Attorney General.
Also, I assume that the draft is fair to petitioner,
although I think it appropriate - on summary .judgmentJ\to
emphasize arguments advanced by respondents that justify a
full record.
Finally, the draft is
citation of authority,

or secondary.

You

stated that you intended to do some further r

I

respect

would hope some assistance could be obtained in

from the cases cited in the briefs and opinions below.
I hope you~-can accomplish this promptly.
a day or two with the cases should suffice.

I would think
We have been

two months in reaching the draft stage of this case.

I

agree with you as to its importance, but in view of other

3.

commitments here we should move this into circulation as
promptly as possible.
As to making this a Court opinion (which I also would
like), this suggestion must come from the Chief Justice or
one of the other Chambers.

L.F.P.

February 1, 1982
HUNT GINA-POW

To:

,John Wiley

From:

L.F.P., Jr.

Subject:

80-419

Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society

I return herewith your draft No. 3 (the first t have
seen), on w~ich I have done my usual editing. _ The only
substantial revision was in the latter portion of the
opinion.

My impresssion was that your draft was a bit

repetitive at that point.
qally has been qnod enough to make a clean copy that
includes mv editing.

I deliver this also.

In thP time available to me, t have not gone back and
reread the briefs or even Judge Sneed's oµinion - as
normally I like to do.

I assume that you have included or

rejected the principal points made by Judge Sneed.
judge whom I respect.

He is a

You may recall that he was Dean at

Duke before becoming Deputy Attorney General.
Also, I assume that the draft is fair to petitioner,
although I think it appropriate - on summary judgment - to
emphasize arguments advanced by respondents that justify a
full record.

February 2, 1982
JOHN GINA-POW

To:

John Wiley

From:

LFP, Jr.

Subject:

80-419 - Arizona v. Marcopia Medical

I return herewith your draft No. 3 (the first I have
seen), on which I have done my usual editing.

The most

.

'

substantial revision was in the latter portion of the
opinion, where there seemed to be some reptition.
In addition to returning your draft, I have had Sally
make a clean copy that includes my editing.
I now think that I was mistaken as to the type of
opinion.

The sentiment among the four Justices who voted

generally for a remand was that this could be accomplished
in a few paragraphs, as both the DC and CA9 had remanded the
case.

I rather thought we should give additional guidance

from this Court.

Our assignment, however, was only to write

a brief per curiam.

At my request, you have undertaken to

do a per curiam long enough to give some guidance.~

I am

now persuaded that this compromise type opinion is not good
enough.

For reasons stated below, your draft as edited is

not entirely persuasive.

It should either be expanded into

what would be a Court opinion, or cut back to perhaps a

>.

'

2.

paragraph agreeing that on the record before us the summary
judgment motion was correctly denied.
We should discuss which of these courses to pursue.

If

.·'·

,

··:

you think you can expand the present draft into a Court

,·

opinion in a reasonable period of time, I would prefer this.

'

,.'

I am thinking of an opinion that would probably add only
three or four pages to what is already written.

But it has

taken two months to produce this draft, and we simply cannot
afford to spend more than a few additional days on this case

..

before going to press.

',,,
,

..

' .

The areas in the draft that need elaboration include
the following:
1.

We should state the substance of Arizona's

argument.

This could be added on page 4, following the

sentence stating that the complaint was filed.

.

This is

tt._.,,

necessry to give our opinion a proper balance.
2.

',.:
~.,>
·\

Except for Broadcast Music, the antitrust analysis

is almost totally devoid of the citation of authority.

..

,,

I

recognize that there is no controlling case, but surely some
support is available in what has been written in other
cases.

The opinions of the DC and CA9 cite some of the

cases that may help.

.'

;~·

The Michigan Law Review comment cited

by the DC certainly merits inclusion in a footnote.

..

The draft emphasizes "efficiencies", and normally these

.,

are irrelevant where there is a horizontal price-fixing
..

agreement.

,. <

Is there case authority supporting the relevancy

~

"

....

'

~l''.;,i

{,'

~-

3.

of "efficiency" and resulting "economy"?

At least we should

..,'

...,..

;,,

quote at some appropriate place the sentence inv13roadcast
Music (441 U.S. at 21, reading as follows:
......

"Moreover, a bulk license of some type is a
necessary consequence of the integration
necessary to achieve these efficiencies, and
a necessary consequence of an aggregate
license is that its price must be
established."
Perhaps some brief elaboration should precede the quote.
I wrote •GTE Sylvania.

Although it involved vertical

.;1•..,

,·

;,;,'

,r

..

,.'\•

rather than horizontal price-fixing, you might take a look
to see if there is any helpful language in it.

I tried then

to reinstate emphasis on the rule of reason.
Can we properly use any language in/Nat. Society of
Professional Engineers?
The State's petition for cert attacks Judge Sneed's
opinion for emphasizing economies and efficiencies.

It is

therefore important, since we also rely on these, to bolster
our position with citations to the extent these are
available.
3.

As the opinion of the DC emphasizes,

,.

feearrangements by professions - especially the learned
profession - have been viewed differently from price-fixing
in the commercial world.

I would not devote more than a

sentence or two to this point, but would cite - either in
the text or in a note (with quotation) - authoritives
, supporting this difference.

..,

..
~

-·

4.

***
A couple of minor points:
J (a) when the term "agreement" is used in several
places, it is not clear what agreement we are talking about.
My understanding is that the FMC makes a master agreement
with an insurance company, and then enters into individual
agreements with the physicians.

Thus, in a sense there are

"third-party beneficiaries" relationships.
this?

Am I right about

In any event, at some point we ought to made clear

what we are talking about.
/

I

.
'•'

(b)

I would prefer using the term "physician" rather

than doctor, as there are all sorts of "doctors" (including
me!) •
(c)

The quotation on page 3 of your draft from the

"agreement" is incomprehensible.

If it is a correct quote,

I suggest that you forget the quote and simply paraphrase
its meaning.

.,
..
s·

In two or three places I have reframed sentences in
your draft that simply were not clear to me.

It is possible

that I have altered the meaning in doing so.

You might be

.,'
,•.. ,

alert to this possibility.

***
If we expand the opinion along the forgoing lines, and
./;\

are satisfied with it, I will write a note to the Conference
explaining that when I went to work on the case, I concluded
• that we could not afford appropriate guidance without an
··,
~

,. . ~'

.,.'·.-·.

;•

5.

opinion.

We may not sell this, but I am willing to try

unless you think it will require another substantial
commitment of your time.
L. F. P., ,JR
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February 2, l982
JOHN

(.lINA-POW

To:

,John Wiley

From:

LFP, Jr.

Subject:

80-419 - Arizona v. Marcopia Medical

I return herewith your draft No. 3 (the first I have
seen), on which I have done my usual editing.

The most

substantial revision was in the latter portion of the
opinion, where there seemed to be some repti. tion.
In addition to returning your draft, I have had Sally
make a clean copy that includes my editing.
I now think that I was mistaken as to the type of
opinion.

The sentiment among the four Justices who voted

generally for a remand was that thls could be accomplished
ln a few paragraphs, as both the DC and CA9 had remanded the
case.

I rather thought we should give additional guidance

from this Court.

Our assignment, however, was only to write

a brief per curi.am.

At my request, you have undertaken to

do a per cur i am long enough to qi ve some guidance._

I am

now persuaded that this compromise type opinion i9 not good
enough.

For reasons stated below, your draft as edited is

not entirely persuasive.

It should either be expanded into

what would be a Court opinion, or cut back to perhaps a

2.

paragraph agreeing that on the record before us the summary
judgment motion was correctly denied.
We should discuss which of these courses to pursue.

If

you think you can expand the present draft into a Court
opinion in a reasonable period of time, I would prefer this.
I am thinking of an opinion that would probahly add only
three or four pages to what is already written.

But it has

taken two months to produce this draft, and we simply cannot
afford to spend more than a few additional days on this case
before going to press.
The areas in the draft that need elaboration include
the following:
1.

We should state the substance of Arizona's

argument.

This could be added on page 4, followinq the

sentence stating that the comolaint was filed.

This is

necessry to give our opinion a oroper balance.
2.

Except for Broadcast Music, the antitrust analysis

is almost totally devoid of the citation of authority.

I

recognize that there is no controlling case, but surely some
support is available in what has been written in other
cases.

The opinions of the DC and CA9 cite some of the

cases that may help.

The Michigan r..aw Review comment cited

by the DC certainly merits inclusion in a footnote.

The draft emphasizes "efficiencies", and normally these
are irrelevant where there is a horizontal price-fixing
agreement.

Is there case authority supporting the relevancy

3.

of "efficiency" and resulting "economy"?

At least we should

quote at some appropriate place the sentence in Broadcast
Music (441

u.s.

at 21, reading as follows:

"Moreover, a bulk license of some type is a
necessary consequence of the integration
necessary to achieve these efficiencies, and
a necessary consequence of an aggregate
license is that its price must be
established."
Perhaps some brief elaboration should precede the quote.
I wrote GTE Sylvania.

Although it involved vertical

rather than horizontal price-fixing, you might take a look
to see if there is any helpful language in it.

! tried then

to reinstate empha.sis on the rule of reason.

Can we properly use anv language in Nat. Society of
Professional Enqineers?
The State's petition for cert attacks Judge Sneed's
opinion for emphasizing economies and efficienci.es.

It is

therefore important, since we also rely on these, to bolster
our position with citations to the extent these are
available.
3.

As the opinion of the DC emphasizes,

feearrangements by professions - especially the learne~
profession - have been viewed differently from price-fixing
in the commercial world.

I would not devote more than a

sentence or two to this point, but would cite - either in
the text or in a note (with quotation) - authoritives
supporting this difference.

4.

***
A couple of minor points:
(a) when the term "agreement" is used in several

places, it is not clear what agreement we are talking about.
My understanding is that the FMC makes a master agreement

with an insurance company, and then enters into individual
agreements with the physicians.

Thus, in a sense there are

"third-party beneficiaries" re lat ionshi.ps.
this?

Am I right about

In any event, at some point we ought to made clear

what we are talking about.
(b)

I would prefer using the term "physician" rather

than ~octor, as there are all sorts of "doctors" (including
me 1) •
(c)

The quotation on page 3 of your draft from the

"agreement" is incomprehensihle.

If it is a correct quote,

t suggest that you forget the quote and simply paraphrase

its meaning.
In two or three places I have reframed sentences in
your draft that simply were not clear to me.

It is possible

that I have altered the meaning In doing so.

You might be

alert to this possibilitv.

***
If we expand the opinion along the forgoing lines, and
are satisfied with it, I will write a note to the Conference
explaining that when I went to work on the case, t concluded
that we could not afford aporopriate guidance without an

5.

opinion.

We may not sell this, but I am willing to try

unless you think it will require another substantial
commitment of your time.
L. F. P., JR
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TO:

John Wiley

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Feb. 9, 1982

80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County
I like the draft of February 8.
Apart from essentially stylistic editing, my only
change is to condense the final three pages of the draft.
Not only does this marginally aid in reducing the length of
the opinion, but it eliminates the repeating of respondents'
arguments on pages 17 and 18.

I also would relegate to a

footnote the point as to the arguably adverse posture of the
insurance companies.

The more I think of this argument, the

less persuasive it seems.
I have not read recently some of the cases you
cite, and rely on you for the appropriateness of their use.
Several of the Justices here know a good deal about
antitrust law, and our opinion will be scrutinized closely.
If you have questions about my changes, we can
discuss them.

Otherwise, run a fifth draft, have a co-clerk

take a good look at it, and then have a Chambers Draft
printed.

You will note that I will circulate this as a

memorandum, hoping it will become a Court opinion.
In a memorandum accompanying the circulation, I
will acknowledge that we were asked only to do a PC.

But

2.

upon consideration, I conclude that a remand without
discussion would afford no guidance to the District Court,
particularly in view of the fact that there were three
separate - and differing - opinions by the Court of Appeals.

,,

l, l,(/

L.F.P., Jr.
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

John Wiley

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Feb. 9, 1982

80-419 Arizona v. ~aricopa County
I l.ike the draft of February

a.

Apart from eAsentially stylistic erlltinq, mv only

change is to condense the final three pages of the nraft.
Not only does thip, mar~inally aid in reducing the length of

the opinion, but it eliminates the repeating of. resoondents'
arguments on pages 17 and 18.

I also would relegate to a

footnote the point as to the arguably adverse posture of the

insurance companies.

The more I think of thiq argument, the

less persuasive it seems.
I have not read recently some of the cases you
cite, and rely on you for the appropriateness of their use.
Several of the Justices here know a good deal about
antltrust law, and our opinion will he scrutinized closely.
Tf you have questions about my chanqes, we can
dlscuss them.

Otherwise, run a fifth ~raf.t, have a co-clerk

take a good look at it, and then have a ~hambers Draft
printed.

You will note that I will circulate this as a

memorandum, hoping i.t will become a Court opinion.
In a memorandum accompanying the circulation, I
will acknowledqe that we were asked only to do a PC.

But

2.

upon consideration, I conclude that a remand without
discussion would afford no guldance to the District Court,
particularly in view of the fact that there were three
separate - and differing - opinions by the Court of Appeals.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

February 24, 1982
80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

There were four votes (only seven of us sat) to
remand this case for a more fully developed factual record.
I was requested to draft a Per Curiam to this effect.
The case is here in an unsatisfactory posture.
The state filed the complaint alleging a violation of ~1 of
the Sherman Act, and moved for partial summary ju~gment on a
pet se theory. The District Judge deni.ed the motion,
holding that there was no Per se violation and that the rule
of reason should be applied. The DC concJuded, however,
that the evidence was insufficient to make a judgment on the
merits, and - apparently seeking guidance - certified an
appeal under Sl292(b).
A panel of CA9 split three ways. Judge Sneed
affirmed, agreeing with the DC that there was no per se
violation. Judge Kennedy concurred in the affirmance, but
made clear that he would leave open until the record was
complete the question of a per se violation. Judge Larson
dissented, agruing that a per se violation had been shown.

In these circumstances, if we remanded without
affording some guidance, the DC would be in precisely the
position it was prior to certifying the appeal. With three
separate opinions from CA9, I suppose the DC simply would
adhere to its view that there was no per se violation.
Accordingly, I have written a rather full
memorandum that purports to give some guidance to the DC on
remand. My memorandum would leave entirely open the
ultimate decision of the case after a fully developed
factual record enables the court to resolve the unanswered
questions.

L. F. P. , ,Jr.

ss

lfp/ss 02/09/82

Rider A, p. 17 (Maricopa)

MAR14 SALLY-POW

As noted above in Part III, the justifications advanced
for the role of physicians merit consideration.

It

certainly is not clear on the record before us that this
plan fails to benefit insured patients or
thaf participation by physicians in the setting of maximum

~

fees is not essential to -ehe success. Broadcast Music,
Inc., supra, at 20-21.*

* John, add here in summary form, the point that the
willing participation by the insurance companies that have ~
an interest arguably adverse to cartel arrangements, may
provide additional support to respondents' arguments.
Also, John, some of your footnotes in the final
few pages of your present draft may merit adding.

,.

2.

In sum, it cannot be said that no genuine issue of
material fact is present on this record and that
petitioner is entitled to a judgment as a
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c).

matter of law.

Petitioner has not discharged

its burden of proving that respondents
have entered a plainly anticompetitive combination wanting
in any substantial justification. 14

This holding does

not, of course, immunize the medical service plan at
issue.

Petitioner is free to prove, if it can, its

averments with respect to the anticompetitive
the plan.

effects of

Nor is petitioner foreclosed from showing that

respondents' justifications of the plan are not
substantial or that the alleged efficiencies could not be
achieved in its absence.

If the District Court finds that

petitioner has failed to establish a per se violation of

3.

the Sherman Act, the question will remain whether the plan
comports with the rule of reason.

See United States v.

United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441, n. 16 (1978).
A more fully developed factual record is necessary to
determine the answers to these questions.
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MAR14 SALLY-POW

As noted above in Part III, the jJstifications advanced
for the role of physicians merit consideration.

It

certainly is not clear on the record before us that this
plan fails to benefit insured patients or
thatparticipation by physicians in the setting of maximum

~

fees is not essential to ~

success. Broadcast Music,

Inc., supra, at 20-21.*

* John, add here in summary form, the point that the
willing participation by the insurance companies that have ~
an interest arguably adverse to cartel arrangements, may
provide additional support to respondents' arguments.

Also, John, some of your footnotes in the final
few pages of your present draft may merit adding.

2.

In sum, it cannot be said that no genuine issue of
material fact is present on this record and that
petitioner is entitled to a judgment as a
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c).

matter of law.

Petitioner has not discharged

its burden of proving that respondents
have entered a plainly anticompetitive combination wanting
in any substantial justification. 14

This holding does

not, of course, immunize the medical service plan at
issue.

Petitioner is free to prove, if it can, its

averments with respect to the anticompetitive
the plan.

effects of

Nor is petitioner foreclosed from showing that

respondents' justifications of the plan are not
substantial or that the alleged efficiencies could not be
achieved in its absence.

If the District Court finds that

petitioner has failed to establish a per se violation of

3.

the Sherman Act, the question will remain whether the plan
comports with the rule of reason.

See United States v.

United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441, n. 16 (1978}.
A more fully developed factual record is necessary to
determine the answers to these questions.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 26, 1982

Re:

80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County

Dear Lewis:
The analysis in your memorandum is somewhat
puzzling. If the maximum price fixing arrangement
is illegal per se--as I believe it is--I do not
understand how any of the three justifications can
save it.
If you are saying that an arrangement is
not a "price fixing" agreement that deserves per se
condemnation if the participants are motivated by
any purpose except stifling competition, not much
will remain of the per se doctrine.
In any event,
I intend to adhere to the position I took in Conference
and will be writing in dissent as soon as I can.
Respectfully,

Jv(_
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.fnprtnu ~ltmi ltf tlrt 'Jmttb _fbdts:

jflaglpngton. J. QJ. 2llffe~,
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 1, 1982
Re:

No. 80-419

Arizona v. Maricopa County

Dear Lewis:
I am in substantial agreement with the third draft of
your memorandum and will join it if it becomes an opinion
of the Court.

Sincerely

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

'v /

.iu:p-rrmt <!Jottrl of tlrt ~ t h .:§tatt.tr
~ ~ n . ~- cq. 20ffe){.~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March 3, 1982

Re:

80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society

Dear Lewis:

I shall await John's dissent.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
cpm
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~Jrmgto-n. J.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March 3, 1982

Re:

80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society

Dear Lewis:
I shall await John's dissent.

Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
cpm

J;u.µum~ (!J4ttttt d

tq~ ~ttlt.tb j5taus

Jbt.sqittgbm. ~- QJ. 2ll.;i,.,

March 4, 1982

CHAMBE:RS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society
Dear Lewis and John:
Will the one of you who ultimately "prevails" in this
case please note that I took no part in its consideration or
decision.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

~u.p-ume <qouri of tqt~h ;§taftg

..-u!rmghln. J. QJ.

2llffe~~

March 15, 1982

CHAMBERS Of"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:
'}~

No. 80-419 - Arizona v. Maricopa· County Medical
Society

... -·~. . . ·.;
Dear Lewis:
You will recall my position at Conference was to
"DIG" or affirm.
I am in general agre ement with a
remand but I will, of course, give careful attention to
what John writes, as I am sure you will also. This
is another "sticky" case, and we appreciate your
willingness to take on,the "memo"' assignment.
Regards,

Justice Powell
'•

.

4 .. "'~: ·1..· - :

'I

Copies to the Conference

March 16, 1982
PERSONAL

80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society

Dear Chief:
Thank you for your note, and I understand, of
course, why you are waiting to see what John writes even
though you are "in general agreement" with me.
My understanding is that John thinks a per se
violation already has been shown, and therefore he would
reverse on the merits. This would be contrary to your vote
at Conference to DIG or affirm.
Only s~ven of us are participating in this case,
so that I will neea you and Byron if there ls to be a Court
opinion. In the absence of a Court opinion here, the oc
will have no idea how to decide the case on remand.
I write this note only to you. Byron is also
awaiting John's dissent. If you are still "with me" when
that is ci. rculated, a prompt join note would be helpful.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
,

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor

----

Justice Stevens
82_ _ __
Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ __

From:

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-419

ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. MARICOPA
COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[March - , 1982)

Memorandum of JUSTICE STEVENS.
The State of Arizona moved for summary judgment on the
issue of liability. Its position was that the respondents' unrebutted allegations, even if true, were insufficient as a matter of law to avoid the application of the per se rule against
horizontal price fixing. The State maintains that position
before this Court. If the State is correct, then it is entitled
to reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment and to entry of
partial summary judgment.
The respondents' brief, the Court of Appeals' majority
opinion, and JUSTICE POWELL'S memorandum have identified a number of genuine issues of fact in this case. For
every factual issue that might require a trial for its resolution, however, there is a preliminary legal question about the
relevance of that issue. If we decide the preliminary legal
question adversely to the respondents, then there is no need
to decide the corresponding factual issue.
First. The issue of fact is whether the restraint that
purports to be a maximum price fixing agreement is actually a masquerade for an agreement to fix specific
prices and to progressively increase the market price for
medical services. The issue of law is whether maximum
price fixing agreements are per se un awful.

~

-
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Second. The issue of fact is whether the maximum
prices fixed by the doctors are above or below those that
would result from purely competitive conditions. The
issue of law is whether the le alit of a rice fixmg
agreement turns on w e er the fixed prices are
r e ~---------------Third. The issue of fact is whether the price fixing
agreement is motivated by any purpose other than to stifle competition and has any other effect, or to put it another way, whether the agreement results in "substantial efficiencies." The issue of law is whether, notwithstanding claims of procompetitive justifications for a
price fixing agreement, the agreement is nonetheless per
se unlawful.
I am not sure which of these factual issues-if any-Jusintends the District Court to try on remand. I
get the impression from his memorandum that the District
Court should collect general information about the health insurance (or health care) indus~ry and decide what rule of law
is appropriate to that industry. Even if this disposition
were consonant with the judicial rather than the legislative
function, and I strongly believe that it is not, it does not simply defer to another day the question whether the per se rule
operates in this industry. Given the procedural posture of
this case, implicit in a remand for a trial of any of the factual
issues that have been advanced is a resolution of the legal
issue corresponding to the factual issue. 1 Any such implicit
holding would represent a major shift in the substantive law
of antitrust.
In this memorandum, I will address separately these issues
oflaw. In section IV, I will address an additional legal argu-

TICE POWELL

1
This is true because on a motion for summary judgment we must assume that the nonmovant would be able to prove all allegations that are
fairly controverted. We would deny the motion only if this proof would be
sufficient to avoid the application of the per se rule.

80-419-MEMORANDUM
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ment about which there would seem to be no genuine issue of
fact: whether the price fixing agreement in this case fits into
the holding of Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, i. e., whether the record discloses price fixing in only a technical or literal sense.
I
One reason for remanding for a trial might be to determine
whether the agreement among doctors to charge certain customers no more than a fixed price is in fact a device to fix the
actual price that will be charged by the participating doctors.
The theory of such a remand would be that a horizontal
agreement to fix maximum prices is legally distinguishable
from an agreement to fix minimum or uniform prices.
As an original proposition, reasonable men might differ on
whether maximum price fixing agreements should be unlawful. Frank Easterbrook has written a persuasive article
supporting the position that maximum price fixing should not
be considered illegal per se, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 886 (1981), whereas an equally conservative
antitrust expert-William F. Baxter-has signed the Solicitor General's brief arguing the contrary position, Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae 12-15. No matter how
we might resolve that question on a clean slate, however, it is
now hornbi)ok law that ~ ~onspiracyto fix maximum priq__es is
subject to the same er se rule as a conspiracy to set uniform
or minimum prices. 2

- -=-----In his hornbook Professor Sullivan has this to say on the subject:
"The policy which insists on individual decisions about price thus has at
its source more than a preference for the independence of the small businessman (though that is surely there) and more than a preference for the
lower prices which such a policy will usually yield to consumers (though
that too is strongly present). Also at work is the theoretical conviction
that the most general function of the competitive process, the allocation
and reallocation of resources in a rational yet automatic manner, can be
carried out only if independence by each trader is scrupulously required.
2
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The statement of the rule in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons,3 Albrecht v. Herald Co.,4 and United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 5 is unequivocal. Moreover, I think everyone would agree that a horizontal maxiCreated out of the confluence of these parallel strivings, the policy has a
breadth which makes it as forbidding to maximum price arrangements as
to the more common ones which forestall price decreases." L. Sullivan,
Antitrust 212 (1977).
3
''The Court of Appeals erred in holding that ~ petitors to fix maximum resale prices of their products does not violate the
Sherman Act. For such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum
prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to
sell in accordance with their own judgment. We reaffirm what we said in
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223: 'Under the
Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity
in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.'" 340 U. S. 211, 213.
'"We think Kiefer-Stewart was correctly decided and we adhere to it.
Maximum and minimum price fixing may have different consequences in
many situations. But schemes to fix maximum prices, by substituting the
perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive
market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete and
survive in that market. Competition, even in a single product, is not cast
in a single mold. Maximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to
furnish services essential to the value which goods have for the consumer
or to furnish services and conveniences which consumers desire and for
which they are willing to pay. Maximum price fixing may channel distribution through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers who otherwise would be subject to significant nonprice competition. Moreover, if
the actual price charged under a maximum price scheme is nearly always
the fixed maximum price, which is increasingly likely as the maximum
price approaches the actual cost of the dealer, the scheme tends to acquire
all the attributes of an arrangement fixing minimum prices.'' 390 U. S.
145, 152-153 (footnote omitted).
5
In addition to the language quoted in Kiefer-Stewart, see n. 4, supra,
the Court in Socony-Vacuum stated:
"Proof that a combination was formed for the purpose of fixing prices and
that it caused them to be fixed or contributed to that result is proof of the
completion of a price-fixing conspiracy under § 1 of the Act.'' 310 U. S.
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mum price fixing agreement is less defensible than a vertical
maximum price fixing agreement. 6 It necessarily follows
that if we were to accept the Easterbrook position, we would
be required to repudiate a rule that has been accepted since it
was first announced in Socony-Vacuum in 1940 and that has
been reaffirmed unequivocally thereafter. 7
Although I have always believed that Congress intended
the Court to have broader discretion in interpreting the general language of the Sherman Act than it has in construing
most other statutes, it seems to me that this rule is so well
150, 224 (footnote 59 omitted).
In footnote 59 the Court added:
"Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may
be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential threat
to the central nervous system of the economy." Id., at 224 n. 59.
6
See Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 886, 890,
n. 20 (1981), and sources cited therein. Everyone, that is, except the respondents, which distinguish Keifer-Stewart and Albrecht in part on the
ground that the primary maximum price fixing agreements in those cases
arose in the vertical context. See Brief for Respondents 41.
7
"It has long been established that an agreement to fix prices is unlawful
per se." Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 643, 647. The
per se rule has been applied to an agreement among competitors to fix
prices, see, e. g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392;
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290, as well as
to an agreement between a manufacturer and a wholesaler or retailer to fix
resale prices, see, e. g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U. S. 373. The law has not distinguished between minimum and
maximum price fixing, see Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145; KieferStewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211, or between the fixing of
selling prices and the fixing of buying prices, see, e. g., Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219; American Tobacco Co . v. United States, 328 U. S. 781. "Under the Sherman Act a
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or
foreign commerce is illegal per se." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223.
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settled that the doctrine of stare decisis should foreclose its
reexamination unless Congress undertakes to amend the
statute.
JUSTICE POWELL describes as one of the justifications offered by the respondents the fact that the price fixing agreements in this case set only maximum fees. Ante, at 6. I do
not, however, understand what significance, if any, the remainder of his memorandum attaches to this point. 8 Putting
the thought somewhat differently, I believe JUSTICE PowELL'S conclusion would be the same even if the petitioner
proved that all or substantially all doctors in fact charged the
maximum prices and that the effect of the price fixing was to
set the actual market price-and not just the maximum
price-by agreement among competitors.
If the Court were to overrule Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht,
and to hold that a horizontal agreement to fix maximum
prices is not illegal per se, the issue to be tried on remand
would be whether the doctors' agreement to fix maximum
prices is tantamount to an agreement to fix actual prices. 9
If the Court does not overrule those cases, there would seem
to be no reason to try that issue. Moreover, under the analysis in JUSTICE POWELL'S memorandum, even if the petitioner prevailed on that factual question, it would not neces8
JUSTICE PoWEL'L does attempt to distinguish this case from KeiferStewart and Albrecht on the basis of the "presence [in this case] of articulated and unrebutted efficiency justifications." Ante, at 14, n. 16. This
distinction surely does not apply to Albrecht. See the dissenting opinions
of Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart, and the Court's response thereto,
390 U. S. 145, 151, n. 7.
9
See Easterbrook, supra, at 891 ("It is possible that the maximum price
agreement is a disguise for a more traditional cartel, in which event the
agreement should be held unlawful."). The record leaves little doubt
about the resolution of that issue. The administrator of the Maricopa
foundation estimated that only 5 to 15 percent of the bills submitted to the
foundation were lower than the maximum reimbursable price. See Deposition of Anthony D. Mitten, Vol. II, p. 86; 643 F. 2d 553, 555 (CA9 1980).

I

-?
I
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sarily establish that the doctors' price fixing agreement is
unlawful.
II
Judge Sneed's reason for ordering a trial is the easiest to
refute; neither the respondents nor JUSTICE POWELL embraces it. Judge Sneed would uphold the price fixing agreement if it resulted in lower prices than would prevail under
purely competitive conditions. 10 This formulation of the factual issue to be tried is the economic equivalent of the argument made in earlier cases that horizontal price fixing was
not unlawful if the fixed price was "reasonable." That argument was considered and firmly rejected in our first price fixing case, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166
U. S. 290. 11 Cf. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
"Perforce we must take industry as it exists, absent the challenged feature, as our baseline for measuring anticompetitive impact. The relevant
inquiry becomes whether fees paid to doctors under that system would be
less than those payable under the FMC maximum fee agreement. Put differently, confronted with an industry widely deviant from a reasonably
free competitive model, such as agriculture, the proper inquiry is whether
the practice enhances the prices charged for the services. In simplified
economic terms, the issue is whether the maximum fee arrangement better
permits the attainment of the monopolist's goal, viz., the matching of marginal cost to marginal revenue, or in fact obstructs that end." 643 F. 2d
553, 556 (CA9 1980).
11
The Trans-Missouri case was decided on the pleadings. The Court
held that the averments in the defendants' answer were insufficient as a
matter of law. In the answer the defendants had alleged "that the object
of the association at all times had been and was to establish all rates, rules,
and regulations upon a just and reasonable basis." 166 U. S. 290, 304.
They denied "that shippers or the public were in any way oppressed or injured by reason of the rates fixed by the association, but on the contrary
they alleged that the agreement and the association established under it
had been beneficial to the patrons of the railway lines composing the association and the public at large." Ibid. At page 341, the Court stated:
"Although the case is heard on bill and answer, thus making it necessary
to assume the truth of the allegations in the answer which are well pleaded,
10
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85 F. 271, 283--284 (CA61898), aff'd, 175 U. S. 211. 12 In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, we
referred to Judge Taft's "classic rejection of the argument
that competitors may lawfully agree to sell their goods at the
same price as long as the agreed-upon price is reasonable."
435 U. S. 679, 689. In our latest price fixing case, we reiterated the point: "It is no excuse that the prices fixed are
themselves reasonable." Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales,
Inc., 446 U. S. 643, 647. As far as I can determine, the notion that a price fixing agreement is lawful if the agreed-upon
prices are "reasonable" is not considered acceptable by any
current scholars. 13
yet the legal effect of the agreement itself cannot be altered by the answer,
not can its violation oflaw be made valid by allegations of good intention or
of desire to simply maintain reasonable rates .... "
2
' "[T]here are some cases in which the courts, mistaking, as we conceive,
the proper limits of the relaxation of the rules for determining the unreasonableness of restraints of trade, have set sail on a sea of doubt, and
have assumed the power to say, in respect to contracts which have no other
purpose and no other consideration on either side than the mutual restraint
of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in the public interest,
and how much is not."
13
The hazards of inquiring into the reasonableness of the fixed prices are
illustrated by this case. Even assuming that the price fixing agreement
actually performs as a cost containment device, it is wrong to assume that
lower prices are necessarily better than higher prices. Consumers of
medical services are interested in other variables besides cost. An artificially low price, even if altruistically fixed, theoretically will restrict output
of medical services. And the quality of medical services seems to be subordinated to price containment (or enhancement) objectives when, as here,
the price fixing agreement does not account for the differences in skill, experience, and training of individual doctors or for the unusual simplicity or
complexity of a particular case. See Rahl, Price Competition and the
Price Fixing Rule-Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. 137, 142
(1962) ("Those who find it difficult to accept a per se rule when applied to
an agreement to hold prices down miss the point to the rule. The rule is
grounded on faith in price competition as a market force. It is not
grounded on a policy of low selling prices at the price of eliminating
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Although JUSTICE POWELL avoids giving this theory any
approval or placing any reliance upon it, his memorandum
does not repudiate it. If the Court decides to remand this
case, I would hope that its opinion would expressly repudiate
the Court of Appeals' rationale and make it clear that the remand is not for the purpose of deciding whether the prices
fixed by the respondents were "reasonable."

III
JUSTICE POWELL'S memorandum ~ t endorse the
Easterbrook position that horizontal agreements fixing maximum prices are to be tested by a different rule than minimum
or uniform price fixing agreements, and also does not endorse
Judge Sneed's arcane notion that price fixing is lawful if the
fixed price is reasonable. The memorandum also correctly
avoids suggesting that the doctors are exempt from the Sherman Act eit:her because of their profession 14 or because of
their relationship with the insurance business. 15 The theory
that JUSTICE POWELL does endorse, as I understand 1t, aEplies o all forms of horizontal price fixing agreements. The
impact o the tlieory-1 it becomes t e rationale for a Court
opinion-is just as extensive as the rule against price fixing
itself. This case, in short, is one of major importance. 16
competition.").
"The Court has been cautious about applying antitrust principles to the
professions in the same manner that they have been applied to other industries. See National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,
435 U. S. 679, 696; Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 788
n. 17. But the respondents do not allege that there is any professional
motivation for the price fixing agreement. Rather, they allege that the
agreement is justified because it is part of a package for financing health
care. The professions have no more license than any business to fix prices
for services in order to make it more convenient for their customers to pay.
1
• Respondents' McCarran-Ferguson Act defense was denied by the District Court, and that issue is not now before us. See ante, at 4 n. 7.
16
It is noteworthy that the District Court concluded that the rule of reason applies for two reasons: first, a profession is involved; and second, "a
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A

As I read the memorandum, the plaintiff must shoulder the
burden of disproving any possible motivation for the price
fixing other than a purpose to restrain competition. JusTICE POWELL is quite correct in pointing out that in several
of our opinions we have described agreements that are illegal
per se as having "no purpose except stifling of competition."
Ante, at 8; see, e.g., United States v. Topco, 405 U. S. 596,
608. He is not correct, however, when he implies that those
cases hold that no price fixing agreement deserves per se condemnation unless it is first established that there is no other
justification for it. Two quotations from JUSTICE POWELL'S
memorandum will illustrate my point. At page 8, he states:
"Before deciding whether to characterize an arrangement as a 'price fixing' agreement that deserves per se
condemnation, a court must determine whether it is a
'naked restrain[t] of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition.' United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 608 (1972), quoting White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253, 263 (1963)."
And at page 10, the memorandum states:
"Only if it is clear that the agreement among physicians
is 'so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of
the industry is needed to establish [its] illegality' may we
assign the label of per se invalidity. National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States, supra, 35
U. S., at 692."
The first quotation does not fairly characterize Topco. 17
Indeed, in that case the Court strongly reaffirmed the "rigid"
recent antitrust trend appears to be emerging where the Rule of Reason is
the preferred method of determining whether a particular practice is in violation of the antitrust law." App. to Pet. for Cert. 43.
11
And it surely does not fairly characterize White Motor Co. v. United
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application of the per se rule, despite the possibility that proffered efficiency justifications might survive close analysis.
After noting that "[t]his Court has reiterated time and time
again that '[h]orizontal territorial limitations . . . are naked
restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition'" and are "per se violations of the Sherman Act," 405
U. S., at 608, the Court stated:
"We think that it is clear that the restraint in this case
is a horizontal one, and, therefore, a per se violation of
§ 1. The District Court failed to make any determination as to whether there were per se horizontal territorial restraints in this case and simply applied a rule of
reason in reaching its conclusions that the restraints
were not illegal.
In doing so, the District Court
erred.
"Whether or not we would decide this case the same
under the rule of reason used by the District Court is irrelevant to the issue before us. The fact is that courts
are of limited utility in examining difficult economic
problems. Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful
sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the
economy against promotion of competition in another
sector is one important reason we have formulated per se
rules.
"In applying these rigid rules, the Court has consistently rejected the notion that naked restraints of trade
States, 372 U. S. 253. In that case, the Court held that the lawfulness of
the vertical territorial and customer limitations could not be determined on
summary judgment. But the Court's caution did not extend to the pricefixing aspects of the case. According to the Court, "[p]rice-fixing arrangements, both vertical and horizontal, have ... been held to be per se violations of the antitrust laws; and a trial to show their nature, extent, and
degree is no longer necessary." Id., at 260 (citations omitted).
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are to be tolerated because they are well intended or because they are allegedly developed to increase competition." Id., at 608-610 (footnote omitted). 18
The second quotation, this one from Professional Engineers, is taken out of context. The context is made clear by
a full q u o t ~
"There are, thus, two complementary categories of
antitrust analysis. In the first category are agreements
whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is
needed to establish their illegality-they are 'illegal per
se.' In the second category are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the
facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed." 435
U. S., at 692.
This categorization does not mean that an agreement that has
been deemed illegal per se, such as a horizontal price fixing
agreement, must be "so plainly anticompetitive" as it is used
in a particular industry before the Court will apply the per se
18

The Court elaborated on the reason for the rigid application of the per

se rule:
"There have been tremendous departures from the notion of a free-enterprise system as it was originally conceived in this country. These departures have been the product of congressional action and the will of the
people. If a decision is to be made to sacrifice competition in one portion
of the economy for greater competition in another portion, this too is a decision that must be made by Congress and not by private forces or by the
courts. Private forces are too keenly aware of their own interests in making such decisions and courts are ill-equipped and ill-situated for such decisionmaking. To analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing
interests and the endless data that would surely be brought to bear on such
decisions, and to make the delicate judgment on the relative values to society of competitive areas of the economy, the judgment of the elected representatives of the people is required." 405 U. S. 596, 611-612.

r?
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rule to that industry. It means just the contrary. Some
types of agreements have been deemed to be "so plainly anticompetitive" in general that the Court will refuse to consider
whether such an agreement is nonetheless procompetitive in
a particular context. 19 The per se rule against a particular
type of restraint is derivative of a rule of reason analysis of
that restraint; 20 once this Court concludes that such an analysis will result in condemnation in most, if not all, cases, we
indulge in a conclusive presumption of illegality in the form of
a per se rule. 21 The possibility that a more focused rule of
The Court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, explained why the "per se rule is a valid and useful
tool of antitrust policy and enforcement," id., at 8:
" 'This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of
the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.' Northern Pac. R. Co.
v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958).'' Id., at 8, n. 11.
For a thoughtful and brief discussion of the costs and benefits of rule of
reason versus per se rule analysis of price fixing agreements, see F.
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 438-443
(1970). Professor Scherer's "opinion, shared by a majority of American
economists concerned with antitrust policy, is that in the present legal
framework the costs of implementing a rule of reason would exceed the
benefits derived from considering each restrictive agreement on its merits
and prohibiting only those which appear unreasonable.'' Id., at 440.
20
See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 476
(STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[P]roperly understood, rule-of-reason analysis is not distinct from "per se" analysis. On the
contrary, agreements that are illegal per se are merely a species within the
broad category of agreements that unreasonably restrain trade; less proof
is required to establish their illegality, but they nonetheless violate the
basic rule of reason.'').
21
"Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations
about the social utility of particular commercial practices. The probability
that anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the se'

9
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reason analysis of a particular use of the restraint might yield
a different result is no defense to the rule that is justified in
its general application. Thus, in Topco the Court held that
the per se rule was applicable "[w ]hether or not we would decide th[e] case the same way under the rule of reason." 405
U. S., at 609.
Of the types of restraints categorically forbidden, "[a] horizontal agreement to fix prices is the archetypal example."
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 643, 647.
"Congress has not left with us the determination of whether
or not particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise,
healthy or destructive. . . . Whatever may be its peculiar
problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far as
price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike." United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 221-222.
JUSTICE POWELL'S disposition therefore is not justified by
existing law: there is no support for the notion that this Court
(much less a district court by our direction) decides on an industry-by-industry basis whether the per se rule against horizontal price fixing is appropriate. But even if cases in which
the Court has refused to apply the per se rule to a new type of
restraint, see, e. g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U. S. 253, provide any support for this notion, surely the
verity of those consequences must be balanced against its procompetitive
consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a
per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify
them. Once established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial
system of the more complex rule-of-reason trials, see Northern Pac. R. Co.
v. United States, 356 U. S., at 5; United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,
405 U. S. 596, 609-610 (1972), but those advantages are not sufficient in
themselves to justify the creation of per se rules. If it were otherwise, all
of antitrust law would be reduced to per se rules, thus introducing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law." Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 50, n. 16.
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Court should simply decide that the rule of reason applies until we obtain enough experience with horizontal price fixing
agreements in the health insurance (or health care) industry.
We should not leave that lawmaking task to the District
Court in this case.
Unfortunately, the theory of JUSTICE POWELL'S memorandum is not logically limited to industries that have not previously been involved in antitrust litigation. JUSTICE PowELL'S reformulation of the per se rule against horizontal price
fixing conspiracies would, I believe, allow the defendants to
offer a defense of justification in almost every rice fixing
situat10n. Cons1 er, or examp e, a possible minimum price
fixing agreement among airlin.es in today's market situation.
It seems to me that they could reasonably argue that uniformly administered prices would substantially facilitate the
work of travel agents who must quote airline fares for a number of different airlines in a complicated transportation network, and furthermore, that placing a floor on airline fares
would save a number- of carriers from the substantial risk of
bankruptcy with its attendant inconvenience and loss to
members of the general public. Such proof would foreclose
any claim that price fixing was merely a naked restraint with
no purpose except the stifling of competition. If the theory
of the memorandum is accepted, it seems rather clear that
most price fixing cases in the future will be decided under
some form of rule of reason analysis.

B
Even if the Court is uncomfortable with the per se rule
against horizontal price fixing and is willing to reexamine its
justifications, an analysis of the particular restraint in issue
does not make this case a compelling one for such a major
shift in antitrust law.
JUSTICE POWELL'S memorandum seems to assume that the
insurance plans sponsored by the Arizona foundations offer
the public "a unique combination of flexibility and complete

80-419-MEMORANDUM
16

ARIZONAv. MARICOPA COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY

coverage." Ante, at 3. The "unique" feature is presumably
the availability of a plan that "offers complete coverage of
medical expenses but still permits an insured to choose any
physician." Ante, at 4. 22 The characterization is somewhat
misleading. Since only about 70 percent of the doctors in the
relevant market are members of either foundation, the guarantee of complete coverage only applies when an insured
chooses a physician in that 70 percent. If he elects to go to a
non-foundation doctor, he may be required to pay a portion of
the doctor's fee. I do not see how this percentage markedly
differs from that available in most markets. Presumably, at
least 70 percent of the doctors in areas covered under other
programs charge no more than the fee that Blue Shield and
other insurers are willing to reimburse in full. 23 Thus, as is
true in Arizona, if an insured asks his doctor if the insurance
coverage is complete, presumably in about 70 percent of the
The respondents summarize the benefits of the foundation-endorsed
plans:
"In addition to free choice of physicians, the benefits to Foundation insured patients include the possibility of lower insurance premiums (due to
the savings insurers realize on payments to providers), assurance that if a
Foundation provider member is used, the insured will not have to pay any
difference between what the health care provider bills and what the insurance will reimburse (less any deductible in the insurance plan) and knowledge that the health care provider will be discouraged from performing unnecessary treatment because a qualified peer will review the treatment
performed to determine if it is medically necessary or appropriate. Thus
the Foundations offer a health care service different from that which individual physicians or individual insurers could separately provide to the
public." Brief for Respondents 12-13.
But see Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care
Financing, 1978 Duke L.J. 303, 379 ("[T]he means are readily available for
insurers to compete effectively in cost containment. This availability of
alternative means of solving problems that FMCs purport to address
means that the FMCs' alleged benefits are entitled to little weight in the
balancing process.").
23
See Brief for Respondents 42 n. 120.
22
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cases the doctor will say yes and in about 30 percent of the
cases he will say no. There is no reason to believe that it is
more burdensome for an insured to ask the doctor if his fees
are covered by the typical insurance plan 24 than to ask the
doctor if he is a member of the foundation.
There is a difference between typical insurance plans and
the foundation-endorsed plans-the doctors, rather than the
insurers, determine the maximum reimbursable fees. 25 JusTICE POWELL states that "[i]t simply is not clear on the
record before us that ... participation by physicians in the
setting of maximum fees is not essential to the success of this
type of medical insurance service." Ante, at 13. But if
"this type of medical insurance service" is characterized by
what JUSTICE POWELL sees as its "unique" aspects-complete coverage and a choice of doctors-the preceding paragraph makes it plain that price fixing is not necessary to the
successful marketing of the package. Even if price fixing is
desirable, it is not necessary that the doctors do the fixing. 26
By typical insurance plans, I mean those plans in which the insurer
agrees to reimburse the insured for customary and reasonable charges.
This type of coverage "has become the most commonly used method of insurance reimbursement for physicians' services." Dyckman, Council on
Wage and Price Stability, A Study of Physicians' Fees 27 (1978).
25
This is not to suggest that typical insurance plans, such as Blue Shield
plans, are not actually controlled by doctors. Indeed, the belief that they
are has given rise to considerable antitrust litigation. See Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Medical Participation in Control of
Blue Shield and Certain Other Open-Panel Medical Prepayment Plans
(1979); Kass & Pautler, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Physician Control of Blue Shield Plans (1979); Horan & Nord, Application of Antitrust Law to the Health Care Delivery System, 9 Cumberland L. Rev. 685, 710--711 (1979); Weller, Medicaid Boycotts and Other
Maladies from Medical Monopolists: An Introduction to Antitrust Litigation and the Health Care Industry, 11 Clearinghouse Rev. 99, 104-105
(1977). Of course, the price fixing allegations in those cases are one step
removed from the open price fixing among competitors that has occurred in
this case.
25
According to an FTC staff report, "Until the mid-1960's, most Blue
24
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The record indicates that in Arizona the state program for
comprehensive medical and dental care of foster children is
administered by the Maricopa foundation pursuant to a contract under which the maximum fee schedule is prescribed by
a state agency rather than by the doctors. 27 This program
and the Blue Shield plan challenged in Group Life & Health
Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205, 28 indicate
that insurers are capable not only of fixing maximum reimbursable prices but also of obtaining binding agreements with
Shield plans determined in advance how much to pay for particular procedures and prepared fee schedules reflecting their determinations. Fee
schedules are still used in approximately 25 percent of Blue Shield contracts." Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Medical Participation in Control of Blue Shield and Certain Other Open-Panel Medical
Prepayment Plans 128 (1979).
21
In that program, the foundation performs the so-called "peer review"
function as well as the administrative function of paying the doctors' bills,
so we may dismiss the notion that their performance of these functions
under the challenged plans requires the doctors' price fixing agreements.
28
The Court in Royal Drug did not reach the question of the legality of
the challenged plan, 440 U. S. 205, 210, n. 5, for the issue before the Court
was whether the defendants were exempt under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. In an amicus brief, the Department of Justice observed that the
plans probably were legal:
"As a general matter, ... antitrust principles would not preclude the offering of prepaid health insurance programs that use insurer-provider
agreements. For example, the pleadings in this case indicate that the
Pharmacy Agreements are bilateral contracts for the purchase of goods
and services by Blue Shield. Blue Shield has offered to purchase drugs
and pharmacy services from any pharmacy that will accept acquisition cost
plus $2.00. Unless respondents could establish that some conspiracy
among pharmacies is at work the Pharmacy Agreements would not amount
to 'price fixing.' Transactions at a set price, through a series of voluntary
bilateral contracts, are not price fixing even though large numbers of sellers of services may be involved." Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., O.T.
1978, No. 77-952, pp. 10-11.
In this case, it is undisputed that we have a "conspiracy among [doctors] at
work."
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providers guaranteeing the insured full reimbursement of a
participating provider's fee. 29 In light of these examples, it
is not surprising that nothing in the record even arguably
supports the conclusion that this type of insurance program
could not function if the schedules were set in a different
way. 30
29

In a memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment and
permanent injunction, the State made this argument. See 2 App. 354,
370-371. In a responsive memorandum, the respondents argued that this
was a factual issue that was in dispute. See 2 App. 487. However, they
offered no refutation to the State's evidence that insurance plans in which
insurers fixed the maximum reimbursable fees and offered the plan to individual providers existed. To avoid summary judgment, the respondents
at that point could not merely rest on their factual allegations.
The commentators also support the State's argument. See generally
Havighurst, Health Insurers and Health-Care Costs, 5 Health Commun.
Informatics 319 (1979); Havighurst, Controlling Health Care Costs, 1 J.
Health Politics, Policy & Law 471 (1977); Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 Duke L.J. 303;
Havighurst & Kissam, The Antitrust Implications of Relative Value Studies in Medicine, 4 J. Health Politics, Policy & Law 48 (1979); Kallstrom,
Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors: Fee Schedules and the
Sherman Act, 1978 Duke L.J. 645.
30
One of the headings in the respondents' brief asserts that "medical
foundation endorsed insurance plans are a unique product which cannot
exist unless maximum reimbursement levels for the insurance are established by medical foundations." Brief for Respondents 37. The only explanation of this assertion is contained in the following paragraph:
"As in Broadcast Music, as a practical matter it is impossible for an individual insurer to negotiate with a large proportion of the physicians in a
community to establish uniform standards for medical care and uniform defined dollar limits for maximum reimbursement levels which would bind
the treating physician. Foundation endorsed insurance is unique in guaranteeing to the insureds 100% payment of physicians' bills (after the payment of a deductible) for treatment from a large number of physicians in
private practice in the community, and in providing this service through a
number of insurers at competitive insurance premiums. It is something
no individual doctor or insurer could do." Ibid. (footnotes omitted).
This explanation, which is without citation to any evidence or authority ex-
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The best argument that can be made for having doctors fix
the maximum prices is that doctors can do it more efficiently
than insurers. This is Easterbrook's position, see Easterbrook, supra, at 898, and it also seems to be JUSTICE Powcept Broadcast Music, is wholly unsatisfactory. As is stated in the text,
the "unique" benefits of this plan accrue under typical insurance plans that
reimburse the insured for reasonable services at reasonable prices, as long
as the insured asks the doctor whether his fees generally are fully reimbursable under the typical plan. The burden on the insured is the same
under the typical plan and under the foundation-endorsed plan-he must
ask the doctor one simple question.
The only difference is that the doctor's assurance that his fees generally
are fully reimbursable is not backed by a written contract; to that extent it
is not "binding." See Havighurst, Health Insurers and Health-Care
Costs, 5 Health Commun. Informatics 319, 327-328 (1979). The respondents assert that it would be impractical for an insurer to enter into binding
contracts with individual doctors. The assertion is refuted by the Arizona
program for foster children and the Blue Shield plan challenged in Royal
Drug. In any event, the impracticality argument seems overstated.
Someone must canvass the doctors to determine what maximum prices
would be high enough to attract sufficient numbers of individual doctors to
sign up but low enough to make the insurance plan competitive. In this
case that canvassing function is performed by the doctors comprising the
foundation; the foundation then deals with the insurer. I do not understand why the insurers could not bypass the foundation. Under the foundation plan, each doctor looks at the maximum fee schedule fixed by his
competitors and either joins or does not join the plan; the same process
would occur if it were the insurer that offered the maximum fee schedule to
each doctor. Even if there are several insurers in the market, it would not
seem unduly burdensome for each doctor to accept or reject each of the insurers' schedules.
In this regard, it is significant that the fees are set by a group that seems
to have substantial market power in the market for medical services, and
that there is competition among insurance companies in the sale of medical
insurance. Three different carriers provide the Pima foundation medical
coverage, and seven insurers underwrite the Maricopa foundation plans.
The case would be quite different if there were one insurance company that
agreed to reimburse medical costs up to a schedule that it set and the individual doctors were then free to accept or reject the terms imposed by the
company. Cf. Havighurst & Hackbarth, Private Cost Containment, 30
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position, see ante, at 13 and n. 15. But absent some
type of horizontal integration, 31 this Court has never accepted
the argument that the potential efficiencies of a particular
price fixing agreement save the agreement from speedy condemnation. There is no reason to believe either that the efficiency savings in having the doctors fix the maximum fees
are substantial 32 or that they are more substantial than the
procompetitive aspects advanced by defendants to justify
other price fixing agreements. To hold that a remand is
warranted in this case therefore necessarily undercuts the
justifications for the per se rule in all its applications.
Moreover, if the theory of JUSTICE POWELL'S memorandum is accepted, I fail to see why it is necessary to remand
the case before deciding that rule of reason analysis is permisELL'S

New England J . Medicine 1298, 1304 (1979). As long as there is competition among the insurance companies, there is no reason to believe that
they would have the kind of bargaining power against a monopoly of physicians that would be significantly greater than would individual consumers
of medical services. Given the competition among insurance companies,
and a substantial monopoly agreement among doctors, the situation may be
comparable to an industry in which a single union sets wage levels throughout the country in bargaining with competing employers.
31
The relevant market for purposes of antitrust analysis is the market for
medical services, not the market for health insurance. In the market for
medical services, the physicians must be considered competitors of one another. That would not, of course, be true of competitiors who become
partners or participants in some other form of joint venture in which they
pool capital and share the risks of loss and the opportunities for profit. In
such an arrangement, the doctors could of course agree on the fees that
would be charged just as partners in a law firm may agree upon the fees to
be charged. We are concerned, not with such partnerships, but rather
with agreements among independent entrepreneurs who do not contribute
to the performance of services by their competitors in any way except by
agreeing on the maximum fee that they will charge insured patients. The
price fixing agreement is therefore not "ancillary" to any agreement among
the doctors concerning the way in which they will perform medical
services.
32
See n. 30 supra.
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sible. The respondents quite obviously intend to offer evidence of their good motives, evidence that the foundation
plans are desirable, and evidence that price fixing by doctors
yields substantial efficiencies. Although I question the per- ·
suasiveness of that evidence, I see no reason for postponing
the decision of the question concerning its legal relevance until after a trial. On a motion for summary judgment, we can
and must give the respondents every benefit of the doubt on
their allegations. But in my judgment there is no legal difference between justifying a price fixing agreement among
competitors on the ground that they have fixed reasonable
prices for their services---i. e., the Judge Sneed approachand justifying price fixing on the ground that the agreement
makes it possible to develop more reasonable insurance rates
for medical coverage than could be obtained in a free market.
IV
One of the surface complexities of this case derives from
the fact that the doctors' agreement about the prices they
will charge certain insured customers is an aspect of the provision of insurance. There is a sneaking sense that the price
fixing agreement is ancillary to the legitimate transaction of
offering an insurance package to the public. On analysis,
however, this sense becomes nonsense. The respondent
foundations are groups of doctors. They do not sell insurance, either jointly or separately, and they derive no revenue
from the sale of health insurance policies. They sell medical
services. Their combination has merely permitted them to
sell their services to certain customers at fixed prices and arguably to affect the prevailing market price of medical care.
It is this misunderstanding that leads the respondents to
argue that the price fixing aspect of the insurance package is
similar to the price fixing aspect of the blanket license in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 441 U. S. 1. Broadcast Music did not in any way depart from established law concerning price fixing and it provides no support for the respondents' position.
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If company A manufactures knives, company B forks, and
company C makes spoons, they might agree to use a common
agent to sell sets of knives, forks, and spoons. In a literal
sense, such a joint marketing program might be a price fixing
agreement, but since a set of all three items is more marketable than any of the three separate components, and assuming that there is little or no competition among manufacturers of the separate items, their agreement would not be a
typical horizontal price fixing agreement among competitors.
Broadcast Music involved a similar arrangement. The
blanket license was a much more marketable product than
any individual composition, since a single composition was of
little use to the typical buyer of music. Moreover, the blanket license was a product-the right to use copyrighted compositions derived from the entire membership of ASCAPthat was entirely different from the product that any one
composer was able to sell by himself. 33 A "necessary consequence" of the creation of this new product was that its price
had to be established. Id., at 21. But the delegation by the
composers to ASCAP of the power to fix the price for that
product did not place any restraint on the right of any individual copyright owner to sell his own compositions separately to any buyer at any price. 34 Furthermore, there was
little competition among individual composers for their sepa"Thus, to the extent the blanket license is a different product, ASCAP
is not really a joint sales agency offering the individual goods of many sellers, but is a separate seller offering its blanket license, of which the individual compositions are raw material." 441 U. S. 1, 22 (footnote omitted).
34
"Here, the blanket-license fee is not set by competition among individual copyright owners, and it is a fee for the use of any of the compositions
covered by the license. But the blanket license cannot be wholly equated
with a simple horizontal arrangement among competitors. ASCAP does
set the price for its blanket license, but that license is quite different from
anything any individual owner could issue. The individual composers and
authors have neither agreed not to sell individually in any other market nor
use the blanket license to mask price fixing in such other markets." Id., at
23-24 (footnote omitted).
33
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rate compositions. For these reasons, in Broadcast Music
the Court held that the blanket license was not a species of
price fixing categorically forbidden by the Sherman Act. In
essence, the Court held that the record disclosed price fixing
only in a "literal sense." Id., at 8. 35
This case is fundamentally different. The only product
that individual doctors have to sell is their individual services. Their combination in the form of the foundation does
not permit them to sell any different product. Their combination does permit them to sell something intangible-the
promise that all members of the foundation will sell their
services to certain insureds at fixed prices-and it is quite
true that no individual member could sell that "product" separately. But the "product" is nothing more than the price
fixing agreement; the price fixing agreement does not itself
permit the foundation to sell a legitimate product that the individual doctors could not sell separately.
The agreement under attack is an agreement among hundreds of separate entrepreneurs 36 concerning the price at
which each will offer his own services to a substantial number
of consumers. It is true that some are surgeons, some anesthesiologists, and some psychiatrists, but unlike the knifefork-spoon example, the doctors do not sell a package of three
kinds of services and their price fixing involves an agreement
among competing surgeons, competing psychiatrists, and
competing anesthesiologists. The analogy to Broadcast
Music would be appropriate if a group of doctors entered into
an arrangement to market their medical services as a package. If a clinic offered complete medical coverage for a flat
fee, the cooperating doctors would have the type of partner35
It is therefore not correct to interpret the Court's holding in Broadcast
Music as approving horizontal price fixing whenever the arrangement
yields "substantial efficiencies." Ante, at 9.
35
There are about 1750 active members of the Maricopa foundation and
about 400 members of the Pima foundation. 1 App. 74; 2 App. 407.
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ship arrangement in which a price fixing agreement among
the doctors would be perfectly proper. For they would pool
their capital and share the risks of loss and the opportunities
for profit. But the fee agreements disclosed by the record in
this case are among independent competing entrepreneurs.
They fit squarely into the classical horizontal price fixing
mold. 37
V
Although there is nothing in the record to support the notion that the foundation-endorsed insurance plans confer special benefits on consumers, the oral argument on behalf of the
respondents apparently created that impression. If that
were the case, one would suppose that the State of Arizona
would be defending these programs instead of challenging
them. Indeed, it is of some interest that the 40 States that
have filed amicus curiae briefs, as well as the United States,
are unanimous in their opposition to this form of setting reimbursement schedules for physicians. Indeed, the organizations representing consumers of medical services-the
American Association of Retired Persons and the National
37
Indeed, one commentator has observed that "[c]ombined physiciancompetitor action to fix the level of reimbursement fees, even if imposing
maximum limits, appears much closer to per se price fixing than either
Catalano's agreement to eliminate credit, or Professional Engineers' ethical ban on price competition in bidding." Halper, The Health Care Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Collision Course?, 49 Antitrust L.J. 17, 28
(1980). He also noted that "the Court's BMI case seems inapposite."
Ibid. (footnote omitted). In that regard, it is significant that the Department of Justice in this case is of the view that the arrangement among the
doctors is distinguishable from the blanket license of Broadcast Music and
is forbidden by the antitrust laws. In Broadcast Music the Court pointed
out that the Department of Justice had recognized that "'some kind of central licensing agency by which copyright holders may offer their works in a
common pool to all who wish to use them"' was an essential mechanism for
marketing music rights. See 441 U. S. 1, 14. There is no suggestion that
there is any need for a common marketing agent for medical services unless
the doctors elect to form some sort of a partnership arrangement.
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Retired Teachers Association-are of the same view. It
seems somewhat fanciful to me to assume that all these doctors are spending so much time and energy in an industrywide, fee-setting program simply to benefit their customers
without any of their customers being aware of the good deeds
that they are performing.
The more I study this case, the more firmly I become convinced that we should reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals largely for the reasons stated in Judge Larson's dissenting opinion. What I have set forth above will be substantially rewritten if it must be converted into a dissenting
opinion.
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without any of their customers being aware of the good deeds
that they are performing.
The more I study this case, the more firmly I become convinced that we should reverse the judgment of the Court of
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March 31, 1982
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RE: No. 80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society, et al.
Dear John:
I agree and will join if it becomes an opinion.

Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

lfp/ss 04/01/82

Rider A, p. 15 (Maricopa)

MAR15 SALLY-POW

* * * * *
In light of John's long and thoughtful
memorandum, I add these observation.

The case is here on

a motion for summary judgment made by the state, a motion
infrequently appropriate for the resolution of an
antitrust case - especially one with the unusual facts of
this case.

As John notes, however, (p. 22 his memo), on a

summary judgment motion, we "must give the respondents
every benefit of the doubt on their allegations".
also concedes that factual issues exist.

John

Our disagreement

is whether they are material, and whether - on a fully
developed record - these and other relevant facts may not
shed controlling light on how this case should be decided.

2.

The case does present a very different situation from the
conventional commercial antitrust case.

As John states:

"This case, in short, is one of major importance."
Memorandum, p. 9.

In my view, it deserves the type of

thorough considertion that only a trial can ensure.

Revision of Note 15, p. 13 (Maricopa)

lfp/ss 04/01/82
MAR15A SALLY-POW

Justice Stevens suggests that the approach of
this memorandum would save an airline cartel's minimum
price agreement from per se condemnation.

Memorandum, 15.

This hypothetical is wholly irrelevant, but it does
illustrate the difference between our two approaches to
this case.

The airline cartel example is the textbook per

se violation, particularly because it would foreclose all
competition in the relevant market.

It also involves

price fixing of substantially identical services:
transportation by air from one point to another.
case presents no comparable situation.
previously, supra n.
not fungible.

This

As noted

---, the service of physicians is

Moreover, the triparte arrangement before

2.

us in this case leaves room for substantial competition.
There are scores of insurance companies that write health
insurance, and only eight of these presently have
contracts with FMC.

Although about 70% of the doctors in

Maricopa County were members of FMC, membership is on a
yearly basis.

None is obligated to renew membership.

The

FMC serves only those insurers and physicians who elect to
use it it.

The brokerage function performed for the

insurers, as noted above, is claimed to embody
efficiencies that result in lower insurance premiums.

In

sum, on the record before us it is wholly unrealistic to
compare this medical service program with an airline
cartel or indeed with any conventional horizontal price
fixing agreement previously before this Court.
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Rider A, p. 11 (Maricopa)

MARllA SALLY-POW

John:

I suggest the following revision of present n. 13.
In this respect, it is relevant to note that FMC

member physicians accept detriments as well as benefits.
Medical service, unlike most commercial products, is not
fungible.

Nor is price (i.e. a physician's charges)

usually a determinative factor in one's choice of
physician.

Thus, the level of competition among

physicians in Maricopa County - as elsewhere in the
medical profession - relates more to reputation, personal
friendships, or even convenience, than to "price".
Because of complications and other widely varying
circumstances peculiar to the patient, charges higher than
the FMC maximum charges often would be customary and

~·

2.

proper.

Physicians who become members forego this

opportunity.

Thus, the integration of functions between

FMC physicians and insurers accomplished through this
health benefit plan involves shared benefits and risks.

John:

Although I am not implying that physicians are not

subject to the antitrust laws, the more I think about this
case the less relevant the typical commerical antitrust
case becomes.
this note.

But take a close look at my recasting of

I am not sure that I have it exactly right.

As indicated with respect to your suggested new sentence
to be added at the end of present note 13, I really don't
understand the point you are making.
reframe it.

Perhaps you could

lfp/ss 04/01/82

Rider A, p. 11 (Maricoa)

MARll SALLY-POW

Justice Stevens repeatedly states that
"horizontal price fixing" agreements and "naked
restraints" on trade are illegal per se.
our cases have so held.

Of course, as

But the relevant question is when

these results-determinative characterizations properly may
be made.
case.

In effect, these are judgment that decide a

It is premature to make them as this time.

case has not been tried.

This

It is before us on a limited

record, follwoing a cetfified appeal after the District
Court denied petitioner's summary judgment motion. In this
posture, all factuals issues must be resolved in
respondent's favor.

'
2.

Justice Stevens does reject, as required by
Broadast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems,
Inc., 441 U.S. 9, a literal test banning all agreements
among competitors that set prices.
31, and p. 22-25.

Memorandum, p. 21, n.

But he reads the cases differently.

In

my view, they require consderation of whether the
challenged arrangements yields pro-competitive and
otherwise unattainable economies before us determining
whether the record supports the fatal "naked restraint" or
"price fixing" characterization.

See id., at 24, n. 35.

As I understand Justice Stevens' memorandum, he
proposes a two-part test.

This test inquires, first,

whether the challenged arrangements yields a "more
marketable" product and, second, whether there was "little
or no competition" among the parties before their entry

~

~

3.

into the agreement or program at issue.

The first

component of this test simply restates a part of the
inquiry that is familiar in our cases:

whether the

challenged arrangement achieves cost savings that make the
resulting product more attractive to consumers.

At this

stage in the present case, we must assume that the
insurance companies - eight in number that are competing
among themselves -

believe that the FMC's do effect cost

savings that make this health insurance arrangement
peculiarly attractive to consumers.

Seep. 4 and n. 5,

supra.
With respect to the second component of Justice
Stevens' test (whether there was "little or no
competition"), his positions appear inconsistent.

Without

citation of authority, he relies upon this component as

4.

the only plausible means of distinguishing Broadcast
Music, Inc.

Memorandum, 23-24. On the other hand, he

concedes (as he must, see id., at 9) that "of course . . .
competitors" such as lawyers and physicians largely may
set prices by entering partnerships.
(emphasis added).

Id., 21, n. 31

See also id., at 24-25.

Indeed, the

size of some law firms are commencing to rival the number
of physicians that would join an FMC.

I therefore find

unpersuasive, and also unprecedented, the test proposed by
Justice Stevens for distinguishing Broadcast Music, and
determining the appropriateness of per se labels.
Justice Stevens is correct, of course, in noting
that the reasonableness of a price level alone is not a
valid antitrust defense.

See Catalano, Inc. v. Target

Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 647; National Society of

5.

Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 689.
But weighing the pro-competitive efficiencies of an
innovative arrangement is not to be equated to an inquiry
into the "reasonableness" of a price fixing scheme.

Note to John:

I have redictated the foreoing primarily to

make it more easily understood by nonexperts in these
moore arcane aspects of antitrust - of whom I am one.
Please look critically at what I have written, and ask
David also to take a look.

I am not at all sure that this

response to Stevens in strengthened by the third and
fourth paragraphs.

Should be omit them.

-

-

lfp/ss 04/26/82
MEMORANDUM
TO:

John

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

April 26, 1982

80-419 Arizona v. Maricopa

Take a look at the brief in 81-398 Union Life, at
p. 14, et seq., with a discussion of Maricopa that mav be of

interest.
The Union Life Insurance Company case is to be
argued this week.

L.F.P., Jr.
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County Medical Society

Dear Lewis,
I
case

have spent considerable time on this
and

conference

have

dee ided,

contrary

vote,

that

Court

the

should be reversed.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
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my

of Appeals
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Dear John:
As between the memoranda, I agree with you.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 80-419

ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. MARICOPA COUNTY
MEDICAL SOCIETY ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether § 1 of the Sherman Act,
15 U. S. C. § 1, has been violated by an agreement among
competing physicians setting, by majority vote, the maximum fees that they may claim in full payment for health services provided to policyholders of specified insurance plans.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the question could not be answered without evaluating the actual purpose and effect of the agreement at a full
trial. 643 F. 2d 553 (1980). Because the undisputed facts
disclose a violation of the statute, we granted certiorari, 450
U. S. 979 (1981), and now reverse.
I
In October 1978 the State of Arizona filed a civil complaint
against two county medical societies and two "foundations for
medical care" that the medical societies had organized. The
complaint alleged that the defendants were engaged in an illegal price fixing conspiracy. 1 After the defendants filed
1
The complaint alleged a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act as well as of
the Arizona antitrust statute. The state statute is interpreted in conformity with the federal statute. 643 F. 2d, at 554, n. 1. The State of Arizona prayed for an injunction but did not ask for damages.
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their answers, one of the medical societies was dismissed by
consent, the parties conducted a limited amount of pretrial
discovery, and the State moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. The District Court denied the
motion,2 but entered an order pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§ 1292(b), certifying for interlocutory appeal the question
"whether the FMC membership agreements, which contain
the promise to abide by maximum fee schedules, are illegal
per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act." 3
2
The District Court offered three reasons for its decision. First, citing
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977), the
court stated that "a recent antitrust trend appears to be emerging where
the Rule of Reason is the preferred method of determining whether a particular practice is in violation of the antitrust law." App. to Pet. for Cert.
43. Second, "the two Supreme Court cases invalidating maximum pricefixing, [Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951), and
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968)], need not be read as establishing a per se rule." App. to Pet. for Cert. 44. Third, "a profession is
involved here." Id., at 45. Under the rule of reason approach, the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue ofliability could not
be granted "because there is insufficient evidence as to the [purpose and
effect of the allegedly unlawful practices and the power of the defendants.]" Id., at 47.
The District Court also denied the defendants' motion to dismiss based
on the ground that they were engaged in the business of insurance within
the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq.
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 39-41. The defendants did not appeal that portion of the District Court order. 643 F. 2d, at 559 and n. 7.
3
The quoted language is the Court of Appeals' phrasing of the question.
643 F. 2d, at 554. The District Court had entered an order on June 5,
1979, providing, in relevant part:
"The plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability is denied with leave to file a similar motion based on additional evidence
if appropriate." App. to Pet. for Cert. 48.
On August 8, 1979, the District Court entered a further order providing:
"The Order of this Court entered June 5, 1979 is amended by addition of
the following: This Court's determination that the Rule of Reason approach
should be used in analyzing the challenged conduct in the instant case to
determine whether a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act has oc-
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The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, affirmed the District Court's order refusing to enter partial summary judgment, but each of the three judges on the panel had a different view of the case. Judge Sneed was persuaded that "the
challenged practice is not a per se violation." 643 F. 2d, at
560. 4 Judge Kennedy, although concurring, cautioned that
he had not found "these reimbursement schedules to be per
se proper, [or] that an examination of these practices under
the rule of reason at trial will not reveal the proscribed adverse effect on competition, or that this court is foreclosed at
some later date, when it has more evidence, from concluding
that such schedules do constitute per se violations." Ibid. 5
curred involves a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and an immediate appeal from the Order denying
plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liablity may
materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation. Therefore, the foregoing Order and determination of the Court is certified for
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b)." Id., at 50-51.
'Judge Sneed explained his reluctance to apply the per se rule substantially as follows: The record did not indicate the actual purpose of the maximum fee arrangements or their effect on competition in the health care industry. It was not clear whether the assumptions made about typical
price restraints could be carried over to that industry. Only recently had
this Court applied the antitrust laws to the professions. Moreover, there
already were such significant obstacles to pure competition in the industry
that a court must compare the prices that obtain under the maximum fee
arrangements with those that would otherwise prevail rather than with
those that would prevail under ideal competitive conditions. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit had not applied Keifer-Stewart, supra, and Albrecht, supra, to horizontal agreements that establish maximum prices;
some of the economic assumptions underlying the rule against maximum
price fixing were not sound.
5
Judge Kennedy's concurring opinion concluded as follows:
"There does not now appear to be a controlling or definitive analysis of
the market impact caused by the arrangements under scrutiny in this case,
but trial may reveal that the arrangements are, at least in their essentials,
not peculiar to the medical industry and that they should be condemned."
643 F. 2d, at 560.
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Judge Larson dissented, expressing the view that a per se
rule should apply and, alternatively, that a rule of reason
analysis should condemn the arrangement even if a per se approach was not warranted. Id., at 563-569. 6
Because the ultimate question presented by the certiorari
petition is whether a partial summary judgment should have
been entered by the District Court, we must assume that the
respondents' version of any disputed issue of fact is correct.
We therefore first review the relevant undisputed facts and
then identify the factual basis for the respondents' contention
that their agreements on fee schedules are not unlawful.

II
The Maricopa Foundation for Medical Care is a non-profit
Arizona corporation composed of licensed doctors of medicine, osteopathy, and podiatry engaged in private practice.
Approximately 1,750 doctors, representing about 70% of the
practitioners in Maricopa County, are members.
The Maricopa foundation was organized in 1969 for the purpose of promoting fee-for-service medicine and to provide the
community with a competitive alternative to existing health
insurance plans. 7 The foundation performs three primary
•Judge Larson stated, in part:
"Defendants formulated and dispersed relative value guides and conversion factor lists which together were used to set an upper limit on fees received from third-party payors. It is clear that these activities constituted maximum price-fixing by competitors. Disregarding any 'special
industry' facts, this conduct is per se illegal. Precedent alone would mandate application of the per se standard.
"I find nothing in the nature of either the medical profession or the
health care industry that would warrant their exemption from per se rules
for price-fixing." Id ., at 56~64 (citations omitted).
7
Most health insurance plans are of the fee-for-service type. Under the
typical insurance plan, the insurer agrees with the insured to reimburse
the insured for "usual, customary, and reasonable" medical charges. The
third party insurer, and the insured to the extent of any excess charges,
bears the economic risk that the insured will require medical treatment.
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activities. It establishes the schedule of maximum fees that
participating doctors agree to accept as payment in full for
services performed for patients insured under plans approved by the foundation. It reviews the medical necessity
and appropriateness of treatment provided by its members to
such insured persons. It is authorized to draw checks on insurance company accounts to pay doctors for services performed for covered patients. In performing these functions,
the foundation is considered an "insurance administrator" by
the Director of the Arizona Department of Insurance. Its
participating doctors, however, have no financial interest in
the operation of the foundation.
The Pima Foundation for Medical Care, which includes
about 400 member doctors, 8 performs similar functions.
For the purposes of this litigation, the parties seem to regard
the activities of the two foundations as essentially the same.
No challenge is made to their peer review or claim administration functions. Nor do the foundations allege that these
two activities make it necessary for them to engage in the
practice of establishing maximum fee schedules.
At the time this lawsuit was filed, 9 each foundation made
use of "relative values" and "conversion factors" in compiling
An alternative to the fee-for-service type of insurance plan is illustrated by
the health maintenance organizations authorized under the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U. S. C. § 300e et seq. Under this form
of pre-paid health plan, the consumer pays a fixed periodic fee to a functionally integrated group of doctors in exchange for the group's agreement
to provide any medical treatment that the subscriber might need. The
economic risk is thus borne by the doctors.
8
The record contains divergent figures on the percentage of Pima
County doctors that belong to the foundation. A 1975 publication of the
foundation reported 80%; a 1978 affidavit by the executive director of the
foundation reported 30%.
9
In 1980, after the District Court and the Court of Appeals had rendered judgment, both foundations apparently discontinued the use of relative values and conversion factors in formulating the fee schedules. Moreover, the Maricopa foundation that year amended its by-laws to provide
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its fee schedule. The conversion factor is the dollar amount
used to determine fees for a particular medical specialty.
Thus, for example, the conversion factors for "medicine" and
"laboratory" were $8.00 and $5.50, respectively, in 1972, and
$10.00 and $6.50 in 1974. The relative value schedule provides a numerical weight for each different medical service-thus, an office consultation has a lesser value than a home
visit. The relative value was multiplied by the conversion
factor to determine the maximum fee. The fee schedule has
been revised periodically. The foundation board of trustees
would solicit advice from various medical societies about the
need for change in either relative values or conversion factors
in their respective specialties. The board would then formulate the new fee schedule and submit it to the vote of the entire membership. 10
The fee schedules limit the amount that the member doctors may recover for services performed for patients insured
under plans approved by the foundations. To obtain this approval the insurers-including self-insured employers as well
as insurance companies 11-agree to pay the doctors' charges
that the fee schedule would be adopted by majority vote of its board of
trustees and not by vote of its members. The challenge to the foundation
actitivities as we have described them in the text, however, is not mooted
by these changes. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629
(1953).
10
The parties disagree over whether the increases in the fee schedules
are the cause or the result of the increases in the prevailing rate for medical services in the relevant markets. There appears to be agreement,
however, that ~95% of physicians in Maricopa County bill at or above the
maximum reimbursement levels set by the Maricopa foundation.
11
Seven different insurance companies underwrite health insurance plans
that have been approved by the Maricopa foundation, and three companies
underwrite the plans approved by the Pima foundation. The record contains no firm data on the portion of the health care market that is covered
by these plans. The State relies upon a 1974 analysis indicating that the
the insurance plans endorsed by the Maricopa foundation had about 63% of
the prepaid health care market, but the respondents contest the accuracy
of this analysis.
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up to the scheduled amounts, and in exchange the doctors
agree to accept those amounts as payment in full for their
services. The doctors are free to charge higher fees to uninsured patients and they also may charge any patient less than
the scheduled maxima. A patient who is insured by a foundation-endorsed plan is guaranteed complete coverage for the
full amount of his medical bills only if he is treated by a foundation member. He is free to go to a nonmember physician
and is still covered for charges that do not exceed the maximum fee schedule, but he must pay any excess that the nonmember physician may charge.
The impact of the foundation fee schedules on medical fees
and on insurance premiums is a matter of dispute. The
State of Arizona contends that the periodic upward revisions
of the maximum fee schedules have the effect of stabilizing
and enhancing the level of actual charges by physicians, and
that the increasing level of their fees in turn increases insurance premiums. The foundations, on the other hand, argue
that the schedules impose a meaningful limit on physicians'
charges, and that the advance agreement by the doctors to
accept the maxima enables the insurance carriers to limit and
to calculate more efficiently the risks they underwrite and
therefore serves as an effective cost containment mechanism
that has saved patients and insurers millions of dollars. Although the Attorneys General of 40 different States, as well
as the Solicitor General of the United States and certain
organizations representing consumers of medical services,
have filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the State of Arizona's position on the merits, we must assume that the respondents' view of the genuine issues of fact is correct.
This assumption presents, but does not answer, the question whether the Sherman Act prohibits the competing doctors from adopting, revising, and agreeing to use a maximum
fee schedule in implementation of the insurance plans.

III
The respondents recognize that our decisions establish that
price fixing agreements are unlawful on their face. But they

,,
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argue that the per se rule does not govern this case because
the agreements at issue are horizontal and fix maximum
prices, are among members of a profession, are in an industry
with which the judiciary has little antitrust experience, and
are alleged to have procompetitive justifications. Before we
examine each of these arguments, we pause to consider the
history and the meaning of the per se rule against price fixing
agreements.
A
Section 1 of the Sherman Act of 1890 literally prohibits
every agreement "in restraint of trade." 12 In United States
v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505 (1898), we recognized
that Congress could not have intended a literal interpretation
of the word "every"; since Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911), we have analyzed most restraints under the so-called "rule of reason." As its name
suggests, the rule of reason requires the factfinder to decide
whether under all the circumstances of the case the restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on
competition. 13
The elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of a chal"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. ... " 15 U. S. C. § 1.
13
Justice Brandeis provided the classic statement of the rule of reason in
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918):
"The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
12
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lenged business practice entails significant costs. Litigation
of the effect or purpose of a practice often is extensive and
complex. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S.
1, 5 (1958). Judges often lack the expert understanding of
industrial market structures and behavior to determine with
any confidence a practice's effect on competition. United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 609-610
(1972). And the result of the process in any given case may
provide little certainty or guidance about the legality of a
practice in another context. Id., at 609, n. 10; Northern
Pac. R. Co. v. United States, supra, at 5.
The costs of judging business practices under the rule of
reason, however, have been reduced by the recognition of per
se rules. 14 Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the
rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption ·that the restraint is unreasonable. 16 As in every
rule of general application, the match between the presumed
and the actual is imperfect. For the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a fullblown inquiry might
have proved to be reasonable. 16
consequences."
14
For a thoughtful and brief discussion of the costs and benefits of rule of
reason versus per se rule analysis of price fixing agreements, see F.
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 438-443
(1970). Professor Scherer's "opinion, shared by a majority of American
economists concerned with antitrust policy, is that in the present legal
framework the costs of implementing a rule of reason would exceed the
benefits derived from considering each restrictive agreement on its merits
and prohibiting only those which appear unreasonable." Id., at 440.
1
• "Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be
unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, division of markets, group
boycotts, and tying arrangements." Nonhern Pac. R. Co. v. United
States, 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958) (citations omitted). See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 522-523 (1948).
16
Thus, in applying the per se rule to invalidate the restrictive practice in
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Thus the Court in Standard Oil recognized that inquiry
under its rule of reason ended once a price fixing agreement
was proved, for there was "a conclusive presumption which
brought [such agreements] within the statute." 221 U. S.,
at 65. By 1927, the Court was able to state that "it has ...
often been decided and always assumed that uniform pricefixing by those controlling in any substantial manner a trade
or business in interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Law." United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S.
392, 398.
"The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if
effective, is the elimination of one form of competition.
The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or
not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price
fixed today may through economic and business changes
become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because of
the absence of competition secured by the agreement for
a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the
necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is
reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596 (1972), we stated
that "[w]hether or not we would decide this case the same way under the
rule of reason used by the District Court is irrelevant to the issue before
us." Id., at 609. The Court made the same point in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., supra, at 50, n. 16:
"Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about
the social utility of particular commercial practices. The probability that
anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the severity of
those consequences must be balanced against its procompetitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se
rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or
important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them."

80-419-OPINION
ARIZONA v. MARICOPA COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY

11

on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the
burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it has
become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic conditions." Id., at 397-398.
Thirteen years later, the Court could report that "for over
forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation
adhered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of
so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements
were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as
a defense." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U. S. 150, 218 (1940). In that case a glut in the spot market
for gasoline had prompted the major oil refiners to engage in
a concerted effort to purchase and store surplus gasoline in
order to maintain stable prices. Absent the agreement, the
companies argued, competition was cutthroat and self-defeating. The argument did not carry the day:
"Any combination which tampers with price structures is
engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the members of the price-fixing group were in no position to control the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered,
or stabilized prices they would be directly interfering
with the free play of market forces. The Act places all
such schemes beyond the pale and protects that vital
part of our economy against any degree of interference.
Congress has not left with us the determination of
whether or not particular price-fixing schemes are wise
or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not permitted
the age-old cry of ruinous competition and competitive
evils to be a defense to price-fixing conspiracies. It has
no more allowed genuine or fancied competitive abuses
as a legal justification for such schemes than it has the
good intentions of the members of the combination. If
such a shift is to be made, it must be done by the Congress. Certainly Congress has not left us with any such
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choice. Nor has the Act created or authorized the creation of any special exception in favor of the oil industry.
Whatever may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements
are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to
all industries alike." Id., at 221-222.
The application of the per se rule to maximum price fixing
agreements in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340
U. S. 211 (1951), followed ineluctably from Socony-Vacuum:
"For such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum
prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own
judgment. We reaffirm what we said in United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223: 'Under
the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate
or foreign commerce is illegal per se.'" Id., at 213.
Over the objection that maximum price fixing agreements
were not the "economic equivalent" of minimum price fixing
agreements, 17 Keifer-Stewart was reaffirmed in Albrecht v.
Herald Co.,_390 U. S. 145 (1968):
"Maximum and minimum price fixing may have different
consequences in many situations. But schemes to fix
maximum prices, by substituting the perhaps erroneous
judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive
market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers
to compete and survive in that market. Competition,
even in a single product, is not cast in a single mold.
Maximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to
furnish services essential to the value which goods have
11
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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for the consumer or to furnish services and conveniences
which consumers desire and for which they are willing to
pay. Maximum price fixing may channel distribution
through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers
who otherwise would be subject to significant nonprice
competition. Moreover, if the actual price charged
under a maximum price scheme is nearly always the
fixed maximum price, which is increasingly likely as the
maximum price approaches the actual cost of the dealer,
the scheme tends to acquire all the attributes of an ar- ·
rangement fixing minimum prices." Id., at 152-153
(footnote omitted).
We have not wavered in our enforcement of the per se rule
against price fixing. Indeed, in our most recent price fixing
case we summarily reversed the decision of another Ninth
Circuit panel that a horizontal agreement among competitors
to fix credit terms does not necessarily contravene the antitrust laws. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S.
643 (1980).
B
Our decisions foreclose the argument that the agreements
at issue escape per se condemnation because they are horizontal and fix maximum prices. Keifer-Stewart and Albrecht
place horizontal agreements to fix maximum prices on the
same legal-even if not economic-footing as agreements
to fix minimum or uniform prices. 18 The per se rule "is
grounded on faith in price competition as a market force [and
not] on a policy of low selling prices at the price of eliminating
It is true that in Keifer-Stewart, as in Albrecht, the agreement involved
a vertical arrangement in which maximum resale prices were fixed. But
the case also involved an agreement among competitors to impose the resale price restraint. In any event, horizontal restraints are generally less
defensible than vertical restraints. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., supra; Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 886, 890, n. 20 (1981).
18
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competition." Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing
Rule-Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. 137, 142
(1962). In this case the rule is violated by a price restraint
that tends to provide the same economic rewards to all practitioners regardless of their skill, their experience, their
training, or their willingness to employ innovative and difficult procedures in individual cases. Such a restraint also
may discourage entry into the market and may deter experimentation and new developments . by individual entrepreneurs. It may be a masquerade for an agreement to fix uniform prices, or it may in the future take on that character.
Nor does the fact that doctors-rather than nonprofessionals-are the parties to the price fixing agreements support
the respondents' position. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 788, n. 17 (1975), we stated that the "public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may
require that a particular practice, which could properly be
viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context,
be treated differently." See National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 696 (1978).
The price fixing agreements in this case, however, are not
premised on public service or ethical norms. The respondents do not argue, as did the defendants in Goldfarb and Professional Engineers, that the quality of the professional service that their members provide is enhanced by the price
restraint. The respondents' claim for relief from the per se
rule is simply that the doctors' agreement not to charge certain insureds more than a fixed price facilitates the successful
marketing of an attractive insurance plan. But the claim
that the price restraint will make it easier for customers to
pay does not distinguish the medical profession from any
other provider of goods or services.
We are equally unpersuaded by the argument that we
should not apply the per se rule in this case because the judi-
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ciary has little antitrust experience in the health care industry. 19 The argument quite obviously is inconsistent with
Socony-Vacuum. In unequivocal terms, we stated that,
"[w]hatever may be its peculiar problems and characteristics,
the Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike." 310 U. S., at 222. We also stated that "[t]he
elimination of so-called competitive evils [in an industry] is no
legal justification" for price fixing agreements, id., at 220,
yet the Court of Appeals refused to apply the per se rule in
this case in part because the health care industry was so far
removed from the competitive model. 20 Consistent with our
prediction in Socony-Vacuum, id., at 221, the result of this
reasoning was the adoption by the Court of Appeals of a legal
standard based on the reasonableness of the fixed prices, 21 an
19
The argument should not be confused with the established position that
a new per se rule is not justified until the judiciary obtains considerable
rule of reason experience with the particular type of restraint challenged.
See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253 (1963). Nor is our
unwillingness to examine the economic justification of this particular application of the per se rule against price fixing inconsistent with our reexamination of the general validity of the per se rule rejected in Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., supra.
20
"The health care industry, moreover, presents a particularly difficult
area. The first step to understanding is to recognize that not only is access to the medical profession very time consuming and expensive both for
the applicant and society generally, but also that numerous government
subventions of the costs of medical care have created both a demand and
supply function for medical services that is artificially high. The present
supply and demand functions of medical services in no way approximate
those which would exist in a purely private competitive order. An accurate description of those functions moreover is not available. Thus, we
lack baselines by which could be measured the distance between the present supply and demand functions and those which would exist under ideal
competitive conditions." 643 F. 2d, at 556.
21
"Perforce we must take industry as it exists, absent the challenged feature, as our baseline for measuring anticompetitive impact. The relevant
inquiry becomes whether fees paid to doctors under that system would be
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inquiry we have so often condemned. 22 Finally, the argument that the per se rule must be rejustified for every industry that has not been subject to significant antitrust litigation
ignores the rationale for per se rules, which in part is to avoid
"the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged
economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken." Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, supra, at 5.
The respondents' principal argument is that the per se rule
is inapplicable because their agreements are alleged to have
procompetitive justifications. The argument indicates a
misunderstanding of the per se concept. The anticompetitive potential inherent in all price fixing agreements justifies
their facial invalidation even if procompetitive justifications
are offered for some. 23 Those claims of enhanced competition
less than those payable under the FMC maximum fee agreement. Put differently, confronted with an industry widely deviant from a reasonably
free competitive model, such as agriculture, the proper inquiry is whether
the practice enhances the prices charged for the services. In simplified
economic terms, the issue is whether the maximum fee arrangement better
permits the attainment of the monopolist's goal, viz., the matching of marginal cost to marginal revenue, or in fact obstructs that end." Id., at 556.
22
In the first price fixing case arising under the Sherman Act, the Court
was required to pass on the sufficiency of the defendants' plea that they
had established rates that were actually beneficial to consumers. Assuming the factual validity of the plea, the Court rejected the defense as a matter of law. UnitedStatesv. Trans-MissouriFreightAssn., 166 U.S. 290
(1897). In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,
435 U. S. 679, 689 (1978), we referred to Judge Taft's "classic rejection of
the argument that competitors may lawfully agree to sell their goods at the
same price as long as the agreed-upon price is reasonable." See United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (CA61898), affd, 175 U. S.
211 (1899). In our latest price fixing case, we reiterated the point: "It is
no excuse that the prices fixed are themselves reasonable." Catalano,
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 643 647 (1980).
23
"Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements
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are so unlikely to prove significant in any particular case that
we adhere to the rule of law that is justified in its general
application. Even when the respondents are given every
benefit of the doubt, the limited record in this case is not inconsistent with the presumption that the respondents' agreements will not significantly enhance competition.
The respondents contend that their fee schedules are procompetitive because they make it possible to provide consumers of health care with a uniquely desirable form of insurance
coverage that could not otherwise exist. The features of the
foundation-endorsed insurance plans that they stress are a
choice of doctors, complete insurance coverage, and lower
premiums. The first two characteristics, however, are
hardly unique to these plans. Since only about 70% of the
doctors in the relevant market are members of either foundation, the guarantee of complete coverage only applies when
an insured chooses a physician in that 70%. If he elects to go
to a non-foundation doctor, he may be required to pay a portion of the doctor's fee. It is fair to presume, however, that
at least 70% of the doctors in other markets charge no more
than the "usual, customary, and reasonable" fee that typical
insurers are willing to reimburse in full. 24 Thus, in Maricopa
and Pima Counties as well as in most parts of the country, if
an insured asks his doctor if the insurance coverage is complete, presumably in about 70% of the cases the doctor will
say yes and in about 30% of the cases he will say no.
It is true that a binding assurance of complete insurance
coverage-as well as most of the respondents' potential for
may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their
reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential
threat to the central nervous system of the economy." United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 224, n. 59 (1940).
24
According to the respondents' figures, this presumption is wellfounded. See Brief for Respondents 42, n. 120.
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lower insurance premiums 25-can be obtained only if the insurer and the doctor agree in advance on the maximum fee
that the doctor will accept as full payment for a particular
service. Even if a fee schedule is therefore desirable, it is
not necessary that the doctors do the price fixing. 26 The
record indicates that the Arizona Comprehensive Medical/
26
We do not perceive the respondents' claim of procompetitive justification for their fee schedules to rest on the premise that the fee schedules
actually reduce medical fees and accordingly reduce insurance premiums,
thereby enhancing competition in the health insurance industry. Such an
argument would merely restate the long rejected position that fixed prices
are reasonable if they are lower than free competition would yield. It is
arguable, however, that the existence of a fee schedule, whether fixed by
the doctors or by the insurers, makes it easier-and to that extent less expensive-for insurers to calculate the risks that they underwrite and to arrive at the appropriate reimbursement on insured claims.
26
According to an FTC staff report, "Until the mid-1960's, most Blue
Shield plans determined in advance how much to pay for particular procedures and prepared fee schedules reflecting their determinations. Fee
schedules are still used in approximately 25 percent of Blue Shield contracts." Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Medical Participation in Control of Blue Shield and Certain Other Open-Panel Medical
Prepayment Plans 128 (1979). We do not suggest that Blue Shield plans
are not actually controlled by doctors. Indeed, as the same report discusses at length, the belief that they are has given rise to considerable antitrust litigation. See also Kass & Pautler, Bureau of Competition, Federal
Trade Commission, Physician Control of Blue Shield Plans (1979). Nor
does this case present the question whether an insurer may, consistent
with the Sherman Act, fix the fee schedule and enter into bilateral contracts with individual doctors. That question was not reached in Group
Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205 (1979).
See id., at 210, n. 5. In an amicus curiae brief, the Department of Justice
expressed its opinion that such an arrangement would be legal unless the
plaintiffs could establish that a conspiracy among providers was at work.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., O.T. 1978, No. 77-952, pp. 10-11. Our
point is simply that the record provides no factual basis for the respondents' claim that the doctors must fix the fee schedule.
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Dental Program for Foster Children is administered by the
Maricopa foundation pursuant to a contract under which the
maximum fee schedule is prescribed by a state agency rather
than by the doctors. 27 This program and the Blue Shield
plan challenged in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205 (1979), indicate that insurers
are capable not only of fixing maximum reimbursable prices
but also of obtaining binding agreements with providers
guaranteeing the insured full reimbursement of a participating provider's fee. In light of these examples, it is not surprising that nothing in the record even arguably supports the
conclusion that this type of insurance program could not function if the fee schedules were set in a different way.
The most that can be said for having doctors fix the maximum prices is that doctors may be able to do it more efficiently than insurers. The validity of that assumption is far
from obvious, 28 but in any event there is no reason to believe
that any savings that might accrue from this arrangement
would be sufficiently great to affect the competitiveness of
these kinds of insurance plans. It is entirely possible that
21

In that program the foundation performs the peer review function as
well as the administrative function of paying the doctors' claims.
28
In order to create an insurance plan under which the doctor would
agree to accept as full payment a fee prescribed in a fixed schedule, someone must canvass the doctors to determine what maximum prices would be
high enough to attract sufficient numbers of individual doctors to sign up
but low enough to make the insurance plan competitive. In this case that
canvassing function is performed by the foundation; the foundation then
deals with the insurer. It would seem that an insurer could simply bypass
the foundation by performing the canvassing function and dealing with the
doctors itself. Under the foundation plan, each doctor must look at the
maximum fee schedule fixed by his competitors and vote for or against approval of the plan (and, if the plan is approved by majority vote, he must
continue or revoke his foundation membership). A similar, if to some extent more protracted, process would occur if it were each insurer that offered the maximum fee schedule to each doctor.
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the potential or actual power of the foundations to dictate the
terms of such insurance plans may more than offset the theoretical efficiencies upon which the respondents' defense ultimately rests. 29
C
Our adherence to the per se rule is grounded not only on
economic prediction, judicial convenience, and business certainty, but also on a recognition of the respective roles of the
Judiciary and the Congress in regulating the economy.
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., supra, at 611-612.
Given its generality, our enforcement of the Sherman Act has
required the Court to provide much of its substantive content. By articulating the rules of law with some clarity and
by adhering to rules that are justified in their general application, however, we enhance the legislative prerogative to
amend the law. The respondents' arguments against application of the per se rule in this case therefore are better directed to the legislature. Congress may consider the exception that we are not free to read into the statute. 30
IV
In this case it appears that the fees are set by a group with substantial
power in the market for medical services, and that there is competition
among insurance companies in the sale of medical insurance. Under these
circumstances the insurance companies are not likely to have significantly
greater bargaining power against a monopoly of doctors than would individual consumers of medical services.
30
"[Congress] can, of course, make per se rules inapplicable in some or all
cases, and leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory
in order to maintain a flexible approach." United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., supra, at 609, n. 10. Indeed, it has exempted certain industries from the full reach of the Sherman Act. See, e. g., 7 U. S. C.
§§ 291-292 (Capper-Volstead Act, agricultural cooperatives); 15 U. S. C.
§§ 1011-1013 (McCarran-Ferguson Act, insurance); 49 U. S. C. § 5b (ReedBulwinkle Act, rail and motor carrier rate-fixing bureaus); 15 U. S. C.
§ 1801 (newspaper joint operating agreements).
29
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Having declined the respondents' invitation to cut back on
the per se rule against price fixing, we are left with the respondents' argument that their fee schedules involve price
fixing in only a literal sense. For this argument, the
respondents rely upon Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1 (1979).
In Broadcast Music we were confronted with an antitrust
challenge to the marketing of the right to use copyrighted
compositions derived from the entire membership of ASCAP.
The so-called "blanket license" was entirely different from
the product that any one composer was able to sell by himself. 31 Although there was little competition among individual composers for their separate compositions, the blanket license arrangement did not place any restraint on the right of
any individual copyright owner to sell his own compositions
separately to any buyer at any price. 32 But a "necessary consequence" of the creation of the blanket license was that its
price had to be established. Id., at 21. We held that the
delegation by the composers to ASCAP of the power to fix
the price for the blanket license was not a species of the price
fixing agreements categorically forbidden by the Sherman
Act. The record disclosed price fixing only in a "literal
"Thus, to the extent the blanket license is a different product, ASCAP
is not really a joint sales agency offering the individual goods of many sellers, but is a separate seller offering its blanket license, of which the individual compositions are raw material." 441 U. S. 1, 22 (1979) (footnote
omitted).
82
"Here, the blanket-license fee is not set by competition among individual copyright owners, and it is a fee for the use of any of the compositions
covered by the license. But the blanket license cannot be wholly equated
with a simple horizontal arrangement among competitors. ASCAP does
set the price for its blanket license, but that license is quite different from
anything any individual owner could issue. The individual composers and
authors have neither agreed not to sell individually in any other market nor
use the blanket license to mask price fixing in such other markets." Id., at
23-24 (footnote omitted).
81
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sense." Id., at 8.
This case is fundamentally different. Each of the foundations is composed of individual practitioners who compete
with one another for patients. Neither the foundations nor
the doctors sell insurance, and they derive no profits from the
sale of health insurance policies. The members of the foundations sell medical services. Their combination in the form
of the foundation does not permit them to sell any different
product. 33 Their combination has merely permitted them to
sell their services to certain customers at fixed prices and arguably to affect the prevailing market price of medical care.
The foundations are not analogous to partnerships or other
joint arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be
competitors pool their capital and share the risks of loss as
well as the opportunities for profit. In such joint ventures,
the partnership is regarded as a single firm competing with
other sellers in the market. The agreement under attack is
an agreement among hundreds of competing doctors concerning the price at which each will offer his own services to a
substantial number of consumers. It is true that some are
surgeons, some anesthesiologists, and some psychiatrists,
but the doctors do not sell a package of three kinds of services. If a clinic offered complete medical coverage for a flat
fee, the cooperating doctors would have the type of partnership arrangement in which a price fixing agreement among
the doctors would be perfectly proper. But the fee agreements disclosed by the record in this case are among inde38
It may be true that by becoming a member of the foundation the individual practitioner obtains a competitive advantage in the market for medical services that he could not unilaterally obtain. That competitive advantage is the ability to attract as customers people who value both the
guarantee of full health coverage and a choice of doctors. But, as we have
indicated, the setting of the price by doctors is not a "necessary consequence" of an arrangement with an insurer in which the doctor agrees not
to charge certain insured customers more than a fixed price.
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pendent competing entrepreneurs. They fit squarely into
the horizontal price fixing mold.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part
in the consideration or decision of this case.
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